Pacifist Japan has slowly transformed from exclusively self-defense to a military buildup

Japan’s Military Buildup Intensifies Amid Rising Tensions with China

Japan is rapidly accelerating its military capabilities to counter China’s growing influence in the region, with plans to double its annual defense spending. This dramatic shift comes as Tokyo strengthens its alliance with the United States while transitioning to leadership under the hawkish Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi.

Japanese officials maintain that the buildup preserves the nation’s peaceful stance while developing a more self-reliant military capable of deterring Chinese aggression. However, critics in Beijing and elsewhere argue that Japan is abandoning its post-World War II pacifist principles, particularly after Takaichi suggested that Chinese military action against Taiwan could warrant a Japanese military response.

This transformation into a major global defense spender has evolved gradually over decades, raising questions about whether the current expansion violates Japan’s constitution.

Japan’s post-war constitution, drafted during the U.S. occupation between 1945 and 1952, explicitly prohibited the country from maintaining military forces. Article 9 of the 1947 constitution renounced the use of force to resolve international disputes and banned the maintenance of land, sea, and air forces for that purpose.

However, Cold War realities quickly reshaped this arrangement. When the Korean War began in 1950, U.S. priorities shifted, leading to the creation of the Japanese Self-Defense Forces in 1954. Article 9 was reinterpreted as allowing Japan to maintain sufficient military capabilities for self-defense only.

Over time, Japan has steadily expanded its definition of self-defense, allowing its troops to participate in international peacekeeping missions, though typically avoiding combat operations. A significant shift occurred in 2014 under then-Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, who reinterpreted Article 9 to permit collective defense. The following year, a new security law enabled Japan to use force if allied nations came under attack, even if Japan itself wasn’t directly threatened.

Takaichi has further tested these boundaries by explicitly citing potential scenarios involving China, departing from the strategic ambiguity maintained by her predecessors.

Recent incidents have heightened tensions between Tokyo and Beijing. In December, Chinese aircraft reportedly locked their radars onto Japanese planes during carrier drills near southwestern Japan—a move considered preparation for missile launches. Earlier in June, two Chinese aircraft carriers were spotted operating near the Japanese island of Iwo Jima for the first time, raising concerns about Beijing’s expanding military reach.

Last week, Takaichi’s Cabinet approved a record defense budget exceeding 9 trillion yen ($58 billion) for the coming year. The plan focuses on strengthening strike-back capabilities and coastal defenses with cruise missiles and unmanned systems.

China quickly condemned the move, with Foreign Ministry spokesperson Lin Jian accusing Japan of “deviating from the path of peaceful development” and “moving further and further in a dangerous direction.” This criticism comes despite China’s own substantial defense expenditures.

Relations are further complicated by historical grievances. Before becoming prime minister, Takaichi regularly visited Tokyo’s controversial Yasukuni Shrine, which honors Japan’s war dead, including convicted war criminals. Many in China and Korea view such visits as demonstrating a lack of remorse for Japan’s wartime aggression.

A fundamental shift in Japanese defense policy occurred in December 2022, when then-Prime Minister Fumio Kishida’s government adopted a security strategy authorizing the development of strike-back capabilities with long-range missiles. The strategy explicitly identifies China as Japan’s primary strategic challenge and calls for a more offensive role for Japanese forces within its U.S. security alliance.

Masahiro Sakata, former head of the Cabinet Legislative Bureau, described this development as “the death of Article 9.”

Post-war Japan had long maintained defense spending at approximately 1% of GDP while focusing on economic development and relying on U.S. security guarantees, including hosting around 50,000 American troops. Under Abe, spending gradually increased to about 1.1% of GDP. Takaichi is on track to reach 2% by March, two years ahead of schedule, with further increases likely as NATO members adopt a new 5% target.

Takaichi’s revised security policy aims to equip Japan with unmanned combat systems and long-range missiles while easing restrictions on arms exports to develop Japan’s defense industry. Japan is already collaborating with the UK and Italy on next-generation fighter jets and finalizing a deal to sell frigates to Australia.

A government panel has proposed developing nuclear submarines to enhance Japan’s deterrence capabilities—a controversial suggestion for a country committed to non-nuclear principles. While Defense Minister Shinjiro Koizumi affirmed Japan’s commitment to not possessing, producing, or allowing nuclear weapons on its territory, he acknowledged that all options for submarine development are under consideration.