Iran gives its field commanders more power over militias in Iraq

Iran Grants Militia Commanders in Iraq Greater Operational Autonomy

Iran has shifted its command structure for militia groups in Iraq, allowing commanders greater independence to carry out operations without Tehran’s direct approval, according to five officials who spoke to The Associated Press on condition of anonymity.

This strategic change, driven by pressures from ongoing regional conflicts, has significant implications for Iraq’s stability and U.S.-Iraq relations. The decentralized approach represents a marked departure from Iran’s previously centralized control over these groups.

“The various forces have been granted the authority to operate according to their own field assessments without referring back to a central command,” one militia official told AP, highlighting the new operational freedom these groups now enjoy.

Many of these Iran-backed militias receive funding through Iraq’s state budget and are embedded within the country’s security apparatus. This arrangement has drawn sharp criticism from the United States and other nations that have been targeted by these groups, with critics arguing that Baghdad has failed to adequately control these factions.

The Iraqi government, led by caretaker Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani, has found itself in a precarious position. Despite mounting pressure from Washington to rein in these militias, Baghdad has struggled to contain them. The most hard-line factions now operate under Iranian advisers using a decentralized command structure that further complicates government control efforts.

This shift became apparent in the aftermath of U.S. and Israeli strikes on Iran in February. Shortly after these events, an Iranian delegation visited Iraq’s Kurdish region with a clear message: if militia attacks escalated near U.S. interests, Kurdish authorities should not expect Tehran to intervene.

“They said they’ve devolved authority to regional Iranian commanders,” a senior Iraqi Kurdish government official revealed. “This time, they wanted to preempt that by saying, ‘We can’t help you with the groups in the south right now.'”

The change reflects lessons learned from a brief but intense 12-day conflict in June, when operations were tightly centralized. Following that conflict, Iran granted greater autonomy to field commanders, allowing them to make operational decisions without waiting for approval from Tehran.

Mahdi al-Kaabi, spokesperson for Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba, one of the Iran-backed groups that have attacked U.S. interests in Iraq, acknowledged coordination with Iran but provided few specifics. “Since we are allies of the Islamic Republic, we have coordination with our brothers in the Islamic Republic,” he stated.

During recent conflicts, U.S. strikes have primarily targeted mid-level commanders rather than top militia leaders. According to Michael Knights, head of research for Horizon Engage and an adjunct fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, the U.S. has also focused on Iranian Revolutionary Guard advisory cells. In one notable strike in Baghdad’s upscale Jadriya neighborhood, three Guard advisers were reportedly killed at a meeting in their headquarters.

At the core of Iraq’s militia problem lies a paradox: the groups the government claims it cannot control are tied to political parties that brought al-Sudani to power. The Coordination Framework, an alliance of influential pro-Iran Shiite factions, was instrumental in his 2022 installation as prime minister.

These militia forces are not rogue entities but part of Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), created in 2014 to formalize volunteer units crucial in defeating the Islamic State. The PMF has since evolved into a formidable force that some observers say now surpasses the Iraqi army in strength and influence.

PMF fighters receive state salaries and access government resources, including weapons and intelligence. Critics point to a fundamental contradiction: state-funded groups operating in alignment with Iranian priorities, sometimes at the expense of Iraq’s national interests.

The United States has intensified its focus on curbing these groups’ power. Last week, Iraq’s ambassador to the U.S. was summoned to Washington to hear American condemnation of attacks on U.S. personnel and diplomatic missions. Additionally, on Friday, the U.S. imposed sanctions on seven commanders and senior members of four hard-line Iran-backed Iraqi militia groups.

“The U.S. is still going to feel it has the freedom of action to hit Iraqi militias,” Knights explained. “That may well play into an effort to try and guide a less militia-dominated government formation.”

Al-Sudani has taken limited steps to curb militia influence, including further institutionalizing the PMF and occasionally removing commanders who operate outside state authority. However, these efforts have encountered significant resistance.

The U.S. may now seek to isolate the most hard-line factions—including Kataib Hezbollah, Harakat al-Nujaba, and Kataib Sayyid al-Shuhada—from others more deeply embedded in Iraq’s political system.

For his part, al-Kaabi offered a dual narrative of his group’s position, emphasizing both its alignment with Iran and its claim to Iraqi state legitimacy. “To put it bluntly, we are allies of the Islamic Republic,” he said, describing the group as part of Iran’s regional “axis” alongside Hezbollah in Lebanon and Ansar Allah in Yemen. Simultaneously, he insisted the group operates within Iraq’s political framework, supporting the state when it serves national interests.