Russian Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns Targeting European Influence

Russia’s Propaganda Success in Europe Reveals Deep Vulnerabilities, Expert Says

Russian propaganda has achieved significant success in Europe through decades of carefully crafted influence campaigns, according to Dieter Pichler, Founder of Austria’s Disinfo Resilience Network (DRN). In an interview with Kyiv Post, Pichler explained that Russian information warfare didn’t begin with the 2022 invasion of Ukraine or even the 2014 annexation of Crimea, but has roots dating back to Soviet “Active Measures” campaigns from the early 1980s.

“Russian propaganda has been extremely successful in Europe for decades, largely because we refuse to counter it or to understand its full extent and the many layers it involves,” Pichler noted.

The influence of Russian narratives varies across European countries, with particularly strong pro-Russian sentiment visible in Serbia and Hungary. However, Pichler emphasized that even long-standing Western nations like Italy and Germany have proven susceptible, citing the tradition of far-left, communist, pro-Moscow and anti-Western “peace movements” in these countries.

A notable development since the Cold War era has been the emergence of pro-Russian far-right factions in most Western European parliaments. Slovakia represents a special case where Russia succeeded through a large disinformation campaign amplified by local collaborators, though there remains strong pro-Western resistance within the country.

While Russian disinformation tactics have incorporated new technologies like AI-generated content and more convincing fake social media profiles, Pichler noted that the core narratives have remained remarkably consistent. “The strength of Russian propaganda is its persistent use of the same talking points,” he said, while warning that classic propaganda methods—including books, media manipulation, and recruitment of Western academics, politicians, and former diplomats—continue to be deployed effectively.

Societies with existing vulnerabilities are particularly susceptible to Russian influence operations. “Certainly, social problems, low economic performance, high energy prices, polarization, challenges with immigration, and a cultural or historical form of Russophilia create fertile ground,” Pichler explained. In countries historically resistant to pro-Russian sentiment, Moscow’s operatives simply pivot to other divisive topics to spread chaos.

One key target for Russian influence are what Pichler describes as “‘self-hating’ Westerners” who focus exclusively on historical Western imperialism while failing to recognize Russian imperialism. These groups, particularly within post-colonial movements, respond positively to Russia’s self-portrayal as a defender of the Global South.

Pacifist movements in Europe, both genuine and manipulated, have also become vectors for Russian narratives. Pichler observed that many pacifists hold such strict views that they oppose even self-defense, requiring them to downplay the aggressor’s goals and ignore the atrocities that occur under occupation.

“For decades we have observed that they adopt a very mild stance toward Moscow while being extremely critical of NATO and the West,” he said. Many in these circles continue to perpetuate debunked theories about NATO enlargement provoking the Ukraine invasion or conspiracy theories about U.S. financing of the Euromaidan protests.

Soviet nostalgia in parts of Eastern Europe provides additional fertile ground for Russian propaganda. Pichler noted that this nostalgia is particularly strong among elderly generations who naturally romanticize their youth, though he emphasized that these sentiments often align with far-right rather than progressive ideologies.

To counter these influence operations, Pichler advocates for comprehensive resilience-building rather than legal restrictions that might impinge on freedom of expression. While platforms must take greater responsibility and tools to counter extremism are necessary, he stressed the importance of education.

“We need to educate our people, every person, about what Soviet active measures did to the West, how they evolved over the years, and how complex Russian propaganda is,” Pichler concluded. His Disinfo Resilience Network brings together historians, political scientists, journalists, and diplomats to develop strategies for building societal resilience against Russian propaganda’s pervasive influence.