Sudan’s Digital Battlefield: How Propaganda Fuels an Ongoing War

The hopes for a peaceful democratic transition in Sudan were shattered on April 15, 2023, when the country erupted into armed conflict. What began as a power struggle between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) has spiraled into a devastating humanitarian crisis, leaving the nation reeling.

The war has taken a particularly dangerous turn in Darfur, with reports of ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity by the RSF potentially constituting genocide, as suggested by human rights organizations and recently confirmed by the U.S. genocide determination. The complexity of the conflict is further exacerbated by the involvement of Islamists associated with former dictator Omar al-Bashir’s National Congress Party (NCP), who have been publicly calling for the continuation of the war in hopes of returning to power.

As the physical conflict unfolds on the ground, a parallel war rages across social media platforms. Sudanese citizens are bombarded with competing propaganda campaigns from warring factions seeking to shape public opinion and domestic agendas. This digital battleground has become a space for deliberate dissemination of manipulative information, disinformation, and divisive hate speech.

The History of Digital Deception in Sudan

Disinformation is not new to Sudan. It has played a significant role in deepening divides and undermining trust in government officials and state-controlled media for years. The rise of organized online disinformation campaigns can be traced to the aftermath of the 2019 revolution that overthrew Bashir’s regime.

Following the revolution, the digital sphere became flooded with dozens of new websites. According to Freedom House’s Freedom on the Net Sudan report, many of these sites were established as part of the “Cyber Jihad Unit,” affiliated with the NCP and focused on monitoring digital activity and managing online propaganda campaigns against the democratic transition.

In October 2021, the leaders of the SAF and RSF jointly orchestrated a military coup, ousting the civilian faction of the transitional government. In the weeks leading to this coup, a systematic campaign flooded Sudanese social media with rumors and disinformation aimed at mobilizing citizens against the transitional government and suggesting military intervention was necessary.

An analysis by Beam Reports, a Sudanese digital media platform, identified at least 20 propaganda campaigns circulated on social media in the weeks before the coup. One prevalent rumor claimed that the head of the United Nations mission in Sudan was giving direct orders to the prime minister regarding cabinet formation, suggesting the army should intervene to end this supposed neocolonial approach.

Competing Narratives: SAF vs. RSF

Since the outbreak of war, both the SAF and RSF have engaged in a virtual conflict across social media and traditional media platforms. Their goal is to shape domestic and international opinions to their advantage, polish their images, and whitewash their roles in derailing Sudan’s democratic transition.

Both sides have remarkably increased their output of photos, videos, interviews, and statements online. Reports have shown that the RSF and SAF maintain extended networks engaging in their respective campaigns, with accounts based in Russia, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, and beyond.

Despite their mutual antagonism, both the RSF and SAF attempt to present themselves as guarantors of stability and defenders of democracy and civilian rule. The RSF portrays itself as the guardian of democratic rule against the Islamists, using the hashtag “#معركة_الديمقراطية” (the “battle for democracy”) in its communications. Meanwhile, the SAF claims to be protecting the unity and sovereignty of the Sudanese state, fighting against what they call the RSF’s mutiny, using the hashtag “#معركة_الكرامة” (the “battle for dignity”).

The RSF’s Digital Strategy

The RSF’s propaganda and disinformation campaigns are particularly sophisticated across social media platforms. Their digital advancement predates the current war, as they have been heavily investing in developing their social media presence for years. This is part of a continuous broader public relations campaign aimed at rebranding the RSF and whitewashing its involvement in atrocities and human rights violations, particularly in Darfur.

Reports have documented how the RSF has hired international communications and public relations firms, including Dickens & Madson in Canada, Think Doctor in France, and Zero Gravity in the UAE to assist in polishing their image and spreading disinformation. Their campaigns have shown clarity and consistency, allowing them to build stronger narratives.

The RSF heavily relied on X (formerly Twitter) to spread its agenda, targeting both local and international audiences. Before their accounts were suspended, they published almost daily statements and footage claiming victories and attempting to rebrand the paramilitary as a pro-democracy group committed to the slogans of the Sudanese revolution: freedom, peace, and justice. They even used the hashtag “#حراس_الثورة_المجيدة” (the “guardians of the glorious revolution”).

X eventually suspended the accounts of the RSF and its leaders in October 2024, while Facebook removed RSF accounts in August 2023. In addition to their official accounts, the RSF has been accused of hijacking at least 900 dormant X accounts to perpetuate its propaganda campaigns. A recent report by Beam Reports revealed Israeli and Emirati user accounts on X participating in the RSF’s disinformation efforts.

The SAF’s Media Approach

The SAF’s utilization of social media platforms for disinformation is more limited and less advanced than the RSF’s. It primarily uses X to share claims of military victories and counter RSF statements. The SAF has also been accused of using bots and trolls to boost its disinformation campaign.

Valent Projects, a UK-based digital agency that addresses online manipulation, examined 12,545 tweets using a pro-SAF hashtag and found that the top 5 percent of accounts showed classic indicators of bot activity, including generic account names, mass posting, and account registration around the time of the 2019 revolution. The agency suggested that only 10 percent of the examined tweets appeared to come from authentic accounts.

Unlike the RSF, the SAF relies more heavily on traditional media, including the National Broadcasting Corporation (radio and television), which it fully controls. The SAF also maintains significant influence over the privately-owned Sudan News Agency (SUNA), which consistently publishes pro-SAF narratives. However, compared to the RSF, the SAF’s messaging has been more contradictory and confusing, making it less effective in shaping public opinion.

The Islamists’ Role

The Islamists, who have mobilized militias to fight alongside the SAF, have significantly increased their propaganda since the beginning of the war. A report by the Sudan Conflict Monitor suggests that Islamist-affiliated accounts are using a coordinated social media strategy to incite hatred and sow divisions.

They have organized campaigns against political leaders and civilian groups, accusing them of colluding with the RSF and attempting to undermine the SAF. They have labeled all actors taking a neutral stance and calling for an end to the war as “traitors” who are “conspiring” with foreign countries, considering peace initiatives as acts of treason.

Their propaganda and disinformation campaigns have advocated for the SAF to recruit jihadists and mobilized citizens to take up arms and join the fighting. Their messaging has consistently pushed against SAF participation in peace talks with the RSF.

While the Islamists’ propaganda campaigns support the SAF and oppose the RSF, they mostly focus on attacking civilian political actors. A recent example was the campaign against the visit of leaders of the Civilian Sudanese Coordination of Civil Democratic Forces (known as Taqadum) to London in October 2024, labeling them as pro-RSF. The campaign resulted in a large protest in London attacking the civilian leaders and advocating support for SAF military action.

The growing anti-civilian propaganda is particularly dangerous as it eliminates space for civil politics in Sudan. Popular pro-SAF social media accounts continue to propagate war propaganda and anti-civilian messages, with some suggesting that the main battle is with civilian actors rather than the RSF. These campaigns are essentially calls for the continuation of the war, intended to obstruct efforts by civilian groups to broker peace.

The Human Cost of Digital Deception

The most immediate danger of these digital campaigns is the risk they pose to millions of vulnerable lives in Sudan. During times of conflict or displacement, those seeking to flee affected areas often turn to social media for guidance and resources, only to find fake accounts exploiting their panic and misleading them.

When trying to access necessities like food, water, and medication, Sudanese citizens caught in the crossfire have often relied on information from official social media sources as a lifeline. The disinformation campaigns have compromised these crucial resources. Various citizens have reported planning their movements in conflict areas based on online information, only to discover it was false, endangering their lives.

The continuation of the virtual war on social media threatens to hinder efforts to find a peaceful resolution. For instance, a report by Arabi Facts Hub analyzed the trending hashtag “#الهدنة_خيانة_عظمى” (“a truce is an act of treason”) propagated by pro-SAF accounts, creating public opinion against potential ceasefire agreements.

These deliberate campaigns fuel the mass arming of civilians, with reports showing that many have been misled and manipulated into joining the fighting. The divisive narratives perpetuated online have polarized Sudanese citizens and exacerbated intercommunal tensions, threatening to damage the country’s social fabric beyond repair.

The war has already severely constrained civic space in Sudan, and such propaganda worsens the situation by limiting the online space for civilians to engage in political dialogue. In the long run, anti-civilian propaganda campaigns are laying the foundations for a fully authoritarian military rule after the war ends, where civilians would have no space in politics. Countering these campaigns is therefore crucial to any initiative aimed at ending the war in Sudan, as tackling the virtual propaganda battle is key to paving the path to peace.