Ukraine’s Database Tracks Russian Propagandists, but Legal Accountability Remains Elusive

Ukraine’s Ministry of Defence has established a public database tracking nearly 200 Russian propagandists accused of legitimizing the occupation of Ukraine and endorsing Russia’s military actions. The database, part of the broader War & Sanctions portal, recently added several prominent Russian cultural figures including poet Ilya Reznik, television host Leonid Yakubovich, comedian Andrey Rozhkov, and singer Alexander Buynov.

“Today, the Kremlin is waging war not only with missiles, tanks and guns,” states the website. “Russian propaganda supports violence, justifies aggression and war crimes, uses dehumanization and hatred of Ukraine as fuel for war, argues Ukraine’s ability to continue the fight.”

The initiative aims to identify individuals for potential international sanctions, entry bans, financial restrictions, and cessation of cooperation. However, experts note that holding these propagandists legally accountable remains extraordinarily challenging, particularly in international courts.

Scott Martin of Global Rights Compliance, an international law foundation, argues that information narratives that “deliberately derail investigations, conceal crimes or obstruct criminal proceedings” could constitute participation in a joint criminal enterprise. Under this framework, propagandists become accomplices rather than mere bystanders.

“Information operations by the Russian Federation in Ukraine follow a systematic pattern,” Martin explains. “Ahead of attacks on the Mariupol Drama Theatre, the Kakhovka Hydroelectric Power Plant, the POW camp in Olenivka, and other crimes, alternative narratives were disseminated that directly contradicted the actual intent.”

These coordinated disinformation campaigns, according to Martin, aim to “sow doubt about responsibility and deliberately delay and distort public discourse” to achieve military and geopolitical objectives.

Despite the clear pattern, Yevhen Zakharov, head of the Kharkiv Human Rights Protection Group, points out that international law provides limited avenues for prosecuting such “speech crimes.” Under the Rome Statute – the founding treaty of the International Criminal Court (ICC) – only “direct and public incitement to commit genocide” is explicitly covered.

“The key is to establish intent to destroy that group, and this requires a much higher standard of proof than in cases of war crimes,” Zakharov notes. Prosecutors must demonstrate that the individual not merely used aggressive language but consciously sought the destruction of a protected group.

Historical precedents do exist. Nazi propagandist Julius Streicher was convicted at the Nuremberg Trials for crimes against humanity based on his antisemitic newspaper Der Stürmer. Similarly, leaders of Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines were found guilty by the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda for directly inciting genocide through their broadcasts during the 1994 genocide.

A more recent case involves Anton Krasovsky, former director of Russia Today (RT), who was convicted in absentia in Ukraine for public incitement to genocide after making on-air calls to drown Ukrainian children. Sentenced to five years in prison with asset forfeiture, Krasovsky remains in Russia with no viable extradition mechanism.

Ukraine’s Prosecutor General’s Office continues to register criminal proceedings related to propaganda and collaboration under several articles of Ukraine’s criminal code, including aiding an aggressor state and justifying Russian aggression. Many of these cases are still pending final verdicts.

Ukrainian officials argue they are pioneering legal practice in holding individuals accountable for promoting a war of aggression. The country views Russian propaganda as a distinct component of Russia’s hybrid warfare aimed at undermining national security and legitimizing war crimes.

At the international level, several human rights organizations – including the International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH), the Centre for Civil Liberties, and the Kharkiv Human Rights Protection Group – filed a submission with the ICC in 2024 urging investigation of Russian propagandists for criminal hate speech.

Illia Nuzov, head of the International Justice Desk at FIDH, acknowledges that while these propaganda episodes will likely not be considered standalone crimes, they may be integrated into broader proceedings as evidence of intent or as components of other crimes such as incitement to genocide.

“In international law, there is a concept known as an inchoate crime, where the mere act of making a call to action is enough to qualify as an offense,” Nuzov explains. “In particular, in the case of incitement to genocide, it is not necessary to prove that the genocide actually occurred – one public call alone is sufficient to recognize the act as a crime.”

The challenge remains establishing specific intent rather than mere aggressive rhetoric. Another potential avenue is classifying systematic hate speech accompanying widespread attacks on civilians as the crime against humanity of persecution – though this approach lacks explicit definition in international conventions and would rely on precedent from international tribunals that have recognized propaganda’s role in fueling mass atrocities.