Nepal’s upcoming parliamentary election on March 5 emerges from one of the most significant political upheavals in the country’s recent history. The GenZ protests of September 8-9 fundamentally altered Nepal’s political landscape, forcing the dissolution of the Nepali Congress and CPN-UML-led coalition government and installing former Chief Justice Sushila Karki as interim Prime Minister.

While the election represents a chance to restore constitutional order, a troubling undercurrent threatens to undermine this democratic process: a wave of propaganda dividing Nepalese society in unprecedented ways.

Though Nepal has held elections during previous political transitions, the current campaign environment may prove more destructive than the crisis it aims to resolve. Instead of policy debates, political discourse has devolved into a battle of competing narratives, creating divisions that could persist long after votes are counted.

The campaign rhetoric has reduced Nepal’s complex governance challenges to simplistic binaries: “desh banaune ra desh jalaune” (those who will build the country versus those who will burn it). Every major political party has positioned itself as the sole guardian of national interests.

The Nepali Congress, revitalized under Gagan Thapa following a special convention, portrays itself as a fresh alternative. The newly formed Nepali Communist Party (NCP), which united several leftist factions after the September protests, claims to represent a new dawn. The Rastriya Swatantra Party (RSP), with Balen Shah as its prime ministerial candidate, presents itself as the outsider ready to dismantle the establishment. Even the CPN (UML) under KP Sharma Oli, which led the government during the protests, asserts nationalist credentials.

These narratives rarely translate into substantive governance proposals. Party manifestos make extraordinary promises: CPN (UML) pledges one million youth jobs in five years, while RSP commits to raising per capita income above $3,000. Others vow to eliminate corruption overnight without specifying mechanisms. These are not policy platforms but propaganda masquerading as policy.

Perhaps most concerning is the resurgence of debates thought settled by the 2015 Constitution. The Rastriya Prajatantra Party (RPP) has revived calls for monarchy restoration, positioning itself as the only true nationalist force and implying others are compromised by foreign interests.

The “nationalist” label has become weaponized across the political spectrum. CPN (UML), despite bearing responsibility for the September 2025 protests, now presents itself as a bulwark against foreign interference. RSP’s candidate Sobita Gautam faced accusations of being an “American agent” based on misleading photographs. AI-generated images showing Gagan Thapa being chased by crowds circulated widely before being debunked.

The Center for Media Research Nepal reports that over 95 percent of online users in Nepal have encountered false information. With 73 percent of Nepalis using smartphones and 37 percent having internet access according to the 2021 National Census, the infrastructure for mass misinformation has never been more robust.

The September protests themselves have become subject to competing narratives. Some remember September 8, when security forces killed protesters, as a day of martyrdom, while others focus on September 9, when mobs destroyed property. These selective memories further polarize the electorate along partisan lines.

Notably absent from campaign discourse are the issues that will shape Nepal’s future: climate change threatening the country’s glaciers and water security; global economic restructuring affecting remittances (currently surging by 32 percent and supporting a foreign reserve of $22.47 billion); and youth unemployment that initially fueled the GenZ protests.

Meanwhile, some leaders, including deposed King Gyanendra, have made alarming claims about threats to Nepal’s sovereignty without providing evidence—manufacturing fear rather than addressing legitimate concerns.

The polarization being created now will not disappear after election day. It will entrench itself in communities, strain relationships, and potentially create long-lasting social divisions. No political force seems willing to step back from these divisive tactics, which appear effective in the short term.

This places responsibility on civil society, independent media, academic institutions, and think tanks to counter propaganda. Nepal needs robust fact-checking capabilities, not just as reactive measures but as proactive, institutionalized functions. Organizations like Nepal Fact Check provide valuable services but require broader support from tech platforms, the Election Commission, and policy bodies.

The propaganda thrives partly because there has been no credible, independent account of recent events that the public can trust. Nepal needs authoritative information from multiple sources—white papers from authorities, investigative reporting, policy briefs, and even social media content that can effectively counter misinformation.

Nepal has progressed from a decade-long armed conflict to a constitutional republic with federal democratic governance—a journey that cost thousands of lives and decades of struggle. To see this framework undermined by propaganda should concern every Nepali citizen.

While the March 5 election will proceed and a government will form, preventing propaganda from becoming the permanent language of Nepali politics must begin immediately afterward. Civil society must speak louder, journalists must maintain standards, and citizens must demand more than slogans and manufactured fear from their leaders.