Researchers Unveil Framework for Analyzing Modern State Propaganda Campaigns

New research by Georgetown University scholars offers fresh insights into how nation-states are adapting their propaganda efforts for the social media age, combining traditional and digital channels in sophisticated ways that challenge existing detection frameworks.

The paper, “Full-Spectrum Propaganda in the Social Media Era,” co-authored by McCourt School Associate Research Professor Renée DiResta and Georgetown University’s Center for Security and Emerging Technology (CSET) Research Fellow Josh Goldstein, reveals that well-resourced states no longer operate through isolated propaganda channels.

“States combine channels — overt and covert, on broadcast and social media — to message to foreign audiences,” explains Goldstein. Their research introduces a framework categorizing propaganda along two key dimensions: overt versus covert, and broadcast versus social media.

Through analysis of leaked operational documents and case studies focusing on the Chinese Communist Party and Russia’s RIA FAN (a state-backed news outlet), the researchers identified two particularly effective tactics that only become visible when viewing the full propaganda spectrum.

The first, “inauthentic amplification,” occurs when covert social media accounts boost content from overt state media. “A lot of fake likes and shares give ordinary social media users the false impression that more people support a position than truly do, influencing or sometimes crowding out genuine discourse,” DiResta notes.

The second tactic, “deceptive sourcing,” involves state broadcast outlets citing fabricated personas or front accounts they themselves created. “This is information laundering: states can make a point seem credible by using an ostensibly independent voice,” DiResta explains. The researchers documented cases where Russian state-linked media embedded tweets from supposed journalists as “evidence,” when in fact Russian troll factories had created those journalist personas.

These integrated approaches create challenges for counter-propaganda efforts. When content is removed from one platform for violating policies, propagandists simply migrate their operations to more permissive spaces — what Goldstein describes as “regulatory arbitrage.”

“If propagandists run fake accounts on multiple channels, labeling or removing them on one platform generally won’t stop their operation. They’ll move over to platforms that are unwilling or unable to track them,” Goldstein explains. Niche platforms, encrypted apps, and federated networks often serve as new homes for these operations.

The emergence of generative AI further complicates the landscape. DiResta, who explored these risks early on in articles for The Atlantic and Wired, notes that AI can “lower the cost of influence operations, make them more scalable, and improve the quality of deceptive content.”

Previous generations of fake accounts often posted content that felt inauthentic due to misused slang or copied material. “Generative AI can generate much more convincing language tailored to a particular community or audience,” DiResta warns. “Newer models are also very adept at producing high-quality images, audio, and video that are increasingly difficult to identify as fake, which deepens the broader trust problem.”

For policymakers, the researchers emphasize the need for a comprehensive approach that recognizes the interconnected nature of modern propaganda systems. The U.S. National Security Strategy highlights the need to protect against “propaganda, influence operations, and other forms of cultural subversion,” but effective counter-measures require looking beyond individual channels.

“To effectively counter propaganda and influence, policymakers need to recognize the full-spectrum nature of the threat, and calibrate their policy tools to each specific channel,” Goldstein advises. “They will also be most effective in their mission if they encourage a flourishing research environment—across social media companies, academic researchers, and independent investigators.”

DiResta concludes with a sobering assessment: “State actors are persistent, so this problem is not going away. That means we need durable, nimble capacity, not one-off responses. The goal is not to come up with a single fix for a single strategy or adversary, but to build resilient institutions that can adapt as the threat evolves.”