Disinformation Flooded Hungary’s Historic Election Campaign, Experts Say

Hungary’s parliamentary election, which saw political newcomer Peter Magyar’s Tisza party sweep to power with a stunning two-thirds majority, was marred by an unprecedented wave of disinformation tactics. As Magyar’s victory ended Viktor Orbán’s 16-year grip on power, analysts are now revealing the extent of information manipulation that occurred during the campaign.

Despite international concerns about Russian interference, experts estimate that at least 90% of election disinformation originated domestically. When measuring actual reach and impact, that figure might be even higher, according to Szilárd Teczár, a journalist with Hungarian fact-checking organization Lakmusz.

“The vast majority of disinformation was homegrown,” Teczár explained. “And within that domestic ecosystem, Orbán’s Fidesz party and its affiliated organizations were the dominant force.”

Researchers noted that pro-government actors deployed significantly more aggressive tactics than in previous elections. Konrad Bleyer-Simon, a research fellow at the European University Institute, highlighted how Orbán’s party created entirely fabricated news stories to undermine opposition credibility.

“What’s different this time is that the government went beyond propaganda and started creating its own facts on the ground,” Bleyer-Simon said. “They actually manufactured fake party platforms for Tisza.”

In one notable incident, Fidesz allegedly forged a document purporting to be Tisza’s policy platform and leaked it to Index, a Hungarian news outlet. The document contained outlandish proposals, including taxes on pets, which Tisza promptly rejected as forgeries. The opposition party subsequently filed multiple lawsuits against media companies that published these false claims.

Fidesz also deployed these fabricated policies on campaign posters nationwide, taking disinformation from online spaces to physical environments across Hungary.

“The government had to become more extreme in their methods because they were genuinely afraid of losing power,” Bleyer-Simon added. “That fear ultimately materialized with Magyar’s sweeping victory.”

While domestic disinformation dominated, Russia’s influence operations were indeed present, though their impact appears more limited than initially feared. Alice Lee, an analyst with NewsGuard, identified what she called the “classic playbook” for Russian election interference targeting Hungary.

One Russian operation, dubbed “Matryoshka,” specialized in creating fake video news reports. In Hungary, the group manufactured a false video purportedly from French outlet Le Monde, falsely claiming a Ukrainian artist had been poisoning Hungarian dogs.

Another Russian actor, identified as Storm-1516, published elaborate fabricated articles that mimicked legitimate news sites. One widely-shared claim falsely stated that Magyar had insulted U.S. President Donald Trump.

“The Russians likely interfered more intensely because they assumed Orbán would be safe due to his control over state media and his hold on the population,” Lee explained. However, many Russian campaigns failed to gain significant traction, partly because they were published in English rather than Hungarian and appeared primarily on X (formerly Twitter), which has limited political influence in Hungary compared to Facebook.

Social media restrictions also shaped the information landscape during the campaign. Meta and Google’s political advertising bans, implemented across the EU in late 2023, forced Hungarian political actors to adapt their digital strategies.

Fidesz responded by creating large private Facebook groups like “Fighters Club” (61,000 members) and “Digital Civic Circles” (over 100,000 members). According to Teczár, these groups functioned as coordination hubs, with members instructed to engage with specific posts to boost their algorithmic reach.

Political Capital, a prominent Hungarian NGO, documented how Fidesz-backed Facebook pages circumvented advertising restrictions. One page labeled as an equestrian group published paid ads featuring fabricated articles that reached at least 100,000 people in a single week.

The election also saw increased use of AI-generated content for political messaging. Fidesz candidates shared AI videos depicting Tisza party members in military uniforms, falsely suggesting they would send Hungarian youth to fight in Ukraine. Tisza politicians countered by posting AI-generated TIME Magazine covers featuring themselves as “Person of the Year,” attempting to build what Political Capital described as “the myth of the man who defies power.”

Despite the unprecedented levels of disinformation, Magyar’s grassroots campaign strategy ultimately prevailed. By traveling “village to village” to connect directly with voters, Tisza managed to overcome the sophisticated information manipulation tactics deployed against them.

As Hungary embarks on a new political chapter, the election serves as a case study in how disinformation tactics continue to evolve—and how they can sometimes fall short of achieving their intended political outcomes.