Russian-Funded Disinformation Network Targets European Election

A secret Russian-funded network is attempting to disrupt upcoming democratic elections in Moldova, a BBC investigation has revealed. Using an undercover reporter, the investigation uncovered a coordinated effort to spread pro-Russian propaganda and fake news aimed at undermining Moldova’s pro-EU ruling party ahead of the parliamentary elections scheduled for September 28.

Participants in the network were paid to post disinformation, secretly record pro-Russian opposition supporters, and conduct unauthorized polling. The network’s organizers suggested that this selective data collection could later be used to question election results if the ruling party wins.

Results from this unofficial “poll,” suggesting the ruling Party of Action and Solidarity (PAS) will lose, have already been published online. However, official polls indicate that PAS, founded by President Maia Sandu, is currently leading the pro-Russian Patriotic Electoral Bloc (BEP).

The BBC investigation found links between this secret disinformation network and Moldovan oligarch Ilan Shor, who has been sanctioned by the United States for “the Kremlin’s malign influence operations” and is now a fugitive in Moscow. The UK has also sanctioned Shor for corruption.

Further connections were established between the network and a non-profit organization called Evrazia, which has ties to Shor and was sanctioned by the UK, US, and EU for allegedly bribing Moldovan citizens to vote against EU membership in last year’s referendum. That referendum narrowly passed despite these efforts.

“In 2024 the focus of [Ilan Shor’s] campaign was money. This year the focus is disinformation,” Moldova’s chief of police, Viorel Cernauteanu, told the BBC World Service.

Moldova’s strategic importance stems from its geographical position between Ukraine and EU-member Romania, making it significant to both European and Russian interests.

The BBC infiltrated the network through a Telegram messaging link provided by a whistleblower. Their undercover reporter, Ana, joined 34 other recruits in attending secret online seminars with titles like “How to go from your kitchen to national leader,” which appeared to serve as a vetting process. Participants had to pass regular tests on the material presented.

Ana was contacted by network coordinator Alina Juc, whose social media profile indicates she is from Transnistria, a separatist region of eastern Moldova loyal to Moscow. Ms. Juc’s Instagram shows multiple trips to Russia in recent years.

Juc told Ana she would be paid 3,000 Moldovan lei ($170, £125) monthly to produce TikTok and Facebook posts before the election. Payment would come from Promsvyazbank (PSB), a sanctioned Russian state-owned bank that serves as the official bank for Russia’s defense ministry and holds shares in one of Shor’s companies.

Recruits were trained to create social media posts using ChatGPT, with instructions to include “satire over reality” while avoiding excessive AI usage to ensure posts appeared “organic.” Initially, participants were asked to create patriotic content about historical Moldovan figures, but demands gradually shifted to overtly political messaging.

Ana was instructed to spread unfounded allegations, including claims that Moldova’s current government plans to falsify election results, that potential EU membership would require citizens to change their “sexual orientation,” and that President Sandu facilitates child trafficking.

The BBC’s monitoring revealed the network comprises at least 90 TikTok accounts, some posing as news outlets, which have posted thousands of videos totaling more than 23 million views and 860,000 likes since January—a significant reach in a country with just 2.4 million people.

When the BBC shared its findings with the US-based Digital Forensic Research Lab (DFRLab), their analysis suggested the network could be even larger, having amassed more than 55 million views and over 2.2 million likes on TikTok since January.

The network’s activities extended beyond online disinformation. Juc offered Ana 200 Moldovan lei ($12, £9) per hour in cash to conduct unofficial polling about preferred election candidates, with training on how to subtly influence respondents. Participants were instructed to secretly record interviewees who supported the pro-Russian opposition, supposedly to “prevent the vote from being rigged”—suggesting these recordings would be used to claim fraud if PAS won.

Evidence indicates the network is being funded from Russia. The BBC recorded Juc on the phone requesting money from Moscow, saying, “Listen, can you bring money from Moscow… I just need to give my people their salaries.”

While it was unclear who would send the money, the BBC found links between the network and Ilan Shor via the Evrazia NGO. Photos of Juc appeared on Evrazia’s website, and one of the Telegram groups Ana joined was called “Evrazia leaders.”

The UK Foreign Office has stated that Evrazia operates “in Moldova on behalf of corrupt fugitive oligarch Ilan Shor… to destabilize Moldovan democracy.”

When contacted, neither Ilan Shor, Evrazia, nor Alina Juc responded to the BBC’s findings.

TikTok said it had implemented additional safety measures ahead of the elections and continued to “aggressively counter deceptive behavior.” Meta, Facebook’s parent company, did not respond.

The Russian embassy in the UK denied involvement in fake news and electoral interference, instead claiming that the EU had been interfering in Moldova’s election.