China’s Propaganda Machine Evolves in Modern Era, Balancing Hard and Soft Approaches

The Chinese state faces a significant propaganda crisis as its traditional messaging becomes less credible and persuasive to an increasingly sophisticated citizenry. This fundamental shift, driven by transformations in the media environment, has forced the government to reimagine how it communicates with the public while maintaining control.

Scholars examining this phenomenon have divided into two distinct camps. The “hard propaganda” viewpoint suggests the state may not actually care about citizen trust, instead focusing on signaling power to deter social mobilization. Meanwhile, the “soft propaganda” perspective argues that the state remains committed to persuasion but has adopted innovative tactics to make its messages more appealing and credible.

This ongoing debate raises critical questions: If the state’s primary goal is to demonstrate strength rather than persuade, why adopt softer tactics? Conversely, if persuasion remains the focus, why does hard propaganda persist? And perhaps most puzzling, how do Chinese citizens maintain high levels of trust in media and government despite evidence showing propaganda’s ineffectiveness?

To address these contradictions, experts propose viewing Chinese propaganda through a holistic lens, recognizing it as an “agitprop apparatus” deeply embedded within the authoritarian system. This approach acknowledges that propaganda serves both traditional persuasion functions and the often-underestimated mission of agitation, which can enhance message credibility.

This “propaganda state 2.0” framework explains how China transformed crises like the COVID-19 pandemic into opportunities to build support, while also revealing why the zero-COVID policy ultimately became a governance disaster. The framework highlights the mobilization tradition in Chinese propaganda and how it can shape—even dictate—state policy in contemporary China.

Unlike the Soviet or Maoist “propaganda state” that was defined by communist ideology and aimed to convert beliefs, today’s Chinese propaganda emphasizes performance over ideology. Modern Chinese propaganda focuses more on demonstrating tangible results rather than ideological indoctrination, reflecting the shift from ideological legitimacy to performance legitimacy.

The COVID-19 pandemic provides a clear case study of this evolved propaganda approach. Initially, the government’s mishandling of the virus sparked widespread criticism. However, the state quickly repositioned itself by demonstrating its ability to manage the crisis effectively. This wasn’t merely improved propaganda technique but rather a reshaping of reality to substantiate its messaging.

Three key tactics emerged: First, the Party mobilized its members to “charge first” in fighting the pandemic, providing living testimony of how it fulfills promises to the people. Second, corrupt or incompetent officials were disciplined and their punishments publicized, demonstrating accountability. Third, the state shaped citizens’ experiences through impressive “public spectacles” like the rapid construction of emergency hospitals in Wuhan, which were live-streamed to tens of millions.

This approach initially succeeded because “there is a coherence between what is done and what is said.” However, the framework also reveals how propaganda can sometimes condition policy agendas that prove costly and ineffective. The abrupt ending of zero-COVID exemplifies this danger—by portraying the virus as extremely deadly and the policy as the only option, propaganda made it difficult to adapt even as social and economic costs became unbearable.

Beyond COVID-19, this propaganda framework applies to other scenarios like natural disaster response and poverty alleviation campaigns. When reality aligns with propaganda promises, the system strengthens; when it fails to align—as with Nancy Pelosi’s 2022 Taiwan visit, where threatening rhetoric wasn’t backed by action—public disappointment can damage credibility.

China’s propaganda apparatus remains an integral component of its governance system, serving both persuasion and agitation functions. Its effectiveness depends not only on messaging tactics but on the regime’s overall performance. As President Xi Jinping expressed, “Empty talk leads the country astray and hard work helps rejuvenate the nation.”