Hungarian Election Marred by Unprecedented Wave of Disinformation

Hungary’s recent parliamentary election, which saw political newcomer Peter Magyar’s Tisza party sweep to a two-thirds majority of 138 seats in the 199-seat parliament, was conducted against a backdrop of widespread disinformation campaigns. The landmark result ended Viktor Orbán’s 16-year grip on power in a stunning political upset that few analysts predicted.

While international observers had raised significant concerns about potential Russian interference throughout the campaign, experts now report that the vast majority of misleading content originated domestically. Szilárd Teczár, a journalist with Hungarian fact-checking organization Lakmusz, estimates at least 90% of disinformation was homegrown—with the figure potentially higher when considering reach and impact.

“What I think is different is that now the government is going beyond propaganda and is also creating its own facts on the ground,” said Konrad Bleyer-Simon, a research fellow at the European University Institute. “They tried to fabricate proof for their propaganda.”

Among the most egregious examples was the creation of a fake party platform for Tisza that was leaked to Index, a Hungarian news site. The fabricated document claimed the opposition planned major tax increases if elected, including bizarre proposals like taxing cats and dogs. Tisza responded by filing several lawsuits against Index and other media outlets that published the false information.

Orbán’s Fidesz party then amplified these fabrications through campaign posters displayed nationwide, featuring the fake policy platforms. Analysts suggest these aggressive tactics reflected genuine fear within Orbán’s camp about losing power—a fear that ultimately materialized with Magyar’s victory.

The pro-government disinformation ecosystem extended beyond the party itself. Teczár points to a wider network including media outlets under Fidesz influence or control, along with proxy organizations such as the National Resistance Movement and Megafon, described as an “influencer network.” These entities were identified as crucial actors in spreading misleading content throughout the campaign.

While Russian interference did occur, its impact appears more limited than initially feared. Alice Lee, an analyst with NewsGuard, observed what she called the “classic playbook” for election interference from the Kremlin. This included operations like “Matryoshka,” which specializes in creating fake video news reports. One example involved a fabricated video purportedly from French outlet Le Monde, falsely claiming a Ukrainian artist had been poisoning Hungarian dogs.

Another Russian actor, Storm 1516, published elaborate articles mimicking legitimate news sites. One prominent piece falsely claimed that Orbán’s main opponent had insulted U.S. President Donald Trump—a claim that gained significant traction on social media platform X.

However, researchers found that many Russian campaigns were conducted in English rather than Hungarian and focused on platforms like X (formerly Twitter) that have relatively low importance in Hungarian political discourse compared to Facebook. “We should be careful not to overexaggerate the effect of outright Russian disinformation pieces, because when we look at their reach and spread, we found that these were quite limited,” Teczár explained.

The campaign also saw significant changes in social media tactics due to new restrictions from Meta and Google. Last October, Meta banned political advertising on its platforms in the European Union due to “legal uncertainties,” while YouTube implemented similar restrictions. These measures partially succeeded in reducing propaganda on these platforms compared to previous elections.

Nevertheless, Fidesz found workarounds, creating private Facebook groups like “Fighters Club” (with over 61,000 members) and “Digital Civic Circles” (exceeding 100,000 members). According to Political Capital, a leading Hungarian NGO, these Fidesz-backed groups ran more than 4,000 ads on Meta to encourage users to join.

“What Fidesz expected from these Facebook groups is to create a structure which can send their supporters to specific social media posts and instruct them to like, share, and comment to boost reach,” Teczár explained.

The election also saw increased use of artificial intelligence in campaign materials. Political Capital documented Fidesz’s use of AI-generated videos on Facebook for “negative campaigning, discrediting and social fear-mongering.” One example showed Tisza party members in military uniforms, falsely suggesting they would take young Hungarians to war.

Despite these extensive efforts to sway voters through misinformation, Magyar’s grassroots campaign strategy—going “village to village” to build support—proved effective against the barrage of false narratives. The result represents a dramatic realignment in Hungarian politics after nearly two decades of Orbán’s nationalist rule.