US official defends Trump’s nuclear test comments by citing mounting risks from other states

U.S. Defends Nuclear Testing Plans Amid Global Tensions

A U.S. government representative has defended President Donald Trump’s proposed resumption of nuclear testing, citing provocative actions by Russia, China, and North Korea during a recent global nuclear arms control meeting in Vienna.

Howard Solomon, U.S. Chargé d’Affaires to the International Organizations in Vienna, addressed the Preparatory Commission of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization on November 10, stating that “the United States will begin testing activities on an equal basis with other nuclear-armed states.” He emphasized that this process would begin immediately and proceed with transparency consistent with national security requirements.

“For any who question this decision, context is important,” Solomon explained. “Since 2019, including in this forum, the United States has raised concerns that Russia and China have not adhered to the zero-yield nuclear test moratorium.”

These concerns relate specifically to supercritical nuclear test explosions banned under the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), where fissile material is compressed to create a self-sustaining nuclear chain reaction. The treaty prohibits any nuclear explosion with a yield, even minimal, following a zero-yield standard.

Solomon pointed to additional factors justifying the U.S. position, including North Korea’s six nuclear explosive tests conducted this century. While the global monitoring network established alongside the CTBT has successfully detected North Korea’s larger-yield tests, experts note it cannot detect very low-yield supercritical tests conducted underground in metal chambers.

The United States has consistently expressed concerns about clandestine testing activities. Since 2019, the State Department has issued annual reports to Congress citing possible testing at China’s Lop Nur site in northwestern Xinjiang and Russia’s Novaya Zemlya facility in the remote Arctic.

President Trump echoed these concerns in a recent “60 Minutes” interview, stating, “Russia’s testing, and China’s testing, but they don’t talk about it. You know, we’re an open society. We’re different. We talk about it.”

The White House has indicated that Trump’s directive aims to establish testing parity with other nuclear powers, though specific details about the planned tests remain undisclosed.

Russia has vehemently denied conducting nuclear tests. At the Vienna meeting, Russia’s Permanent Representative Mikhail Ulyanov called the U.S. allegations “completely unacceptable and unsubstantiated” and warned that resuming nuclear testing “could cause significant damage to the nuclear non-proliferation regime and international security.”

Solomon dismissed Ulyanov’s statements as surprising coming from “a state that has not adhered to the zero-yield nuclear test moratorium.” He cited additional U.S. concerns, including Russia’s alleged violations of New START—the last remaining nuclear arms control treaty between Moscow and Washington—and Russia’s “disproportionately large” stockpile of non-strategic nuclear weapons.

These non-strategic weapons, while physically smaller than their strategic counterparts, pose significant dangers due to their perceived lower threshold for use. They remain outside the scope of arms control treaties, allowing for unconstrained development.

According to the U.S. State Department’s 2023 assessment, Russia maintains between 1,000 and 2,000 non-strategic nuclear warheads, substantially more than the approximately 200 similar weapons in the U.S. arsenal. The Nuclear Notebook, published by the Federation of American Scientists, emphasized this disparity, noting that non-strategic weapons may be the first used in a potential military escalation with NATO.

By contrast, strategic nuclear arsenals remain relatively balanced, with Russia deploying 1,718 strategic weapons compared to 1,770 for the United States, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. These weapons are currently limited by the New START treaty, which will expire on February 5 unless extended.

Russia suspended its participation in New START in 2023 but did not formally withdraw. In September, Russian President Vladimir Putin expressed readiness to adhere to the treaty’s limits for one more year, a proposal Trump characterized as “a good idea” in October.

Without this treaty’s extension, U.S. and Russian strategic nuclear arsenals would be unconstrained for the first time in decades, potentially accelerating an already concerning nuclear arms race.