Russian Propaganda Abroad Directly Linked to Kremlin Intelligence, CCD Report Finds

Russian Intelligence Exposed in Norwegian Academic Infiltration Scheme

Norwegian authorities have uncovered a sophisticated Russian influence operation at Nord University, revealing the deep connections between Russian propaganda efforts and intelligence services. The operation, which targeted an Arctic-focused academic event, demonstrates Russia’s evolving tactics in information warfare beyond traditional media channels.

According to the Center for Countering Disinformation (CCD) under Ukraine’s National Security and Defense Council, sanctioned Russian propagandist Artem Kureyev used a false identity to infiltrate preparations for the “Arctic 2050” conference. The Norwegian Broadcasting Corporation (NRK) first reported the security breach.

“This situation once again proves that Russian propaganda abroad is inseparably connected with the intelligence services,” the CCD stated. “Russia looks for vulnerable platforms to expand its influence, and the Kremlin’s operations are not limited to the media space.”

Security experts note that the timing of the infiltration was particularly strategic. The operation coincided with Russia’s anticipated assumption of the chairmanship of the Arctic Council, a period when Moscow was eager to portray itself as a constructive partner in Arctic development while diverting attention from its military activities in the region.

The investigation’s findings reveal a calculated approach by the Kremlin to exploit academic environments where security screening is typically minimal and trust among participants is high. These settings provide ideal conditions for Russian operatives to establish connections with influential figures.

“Such operations allow Russia to influence politicians, researchers, and the media, using legal formats as instruments of information warfare,” the CCD explained in its report.

Kureyev’s background illustrates the sophisticated nature of Russia’s influence operations. According to journalists cited by the CCD, he has worked for Russian intelligence for more than a decade. His activities reportedly included organizing trips for foreign journalists to temporarily occupied Ukrainian territories, building pro-Russian networks throughout Europe, and creating “expert” platforms designed to amplify Kremlin narratives.

Prior to this exposure, both Kureyev and his propaganda project “African Initiative” had been placed under international sanctions, highlighting ongoing concerns about his activities.

The Arctic has become increasingly important in geopolitical terms as climate change makes previously inaccessible resources potentially available for exploitation. Russia, which controls the largest Arctic coastline of any nation, has been expanding its military presence in the region while simultaneously seeking international cooperation on economic development.

This incident comes amid broader concerns about Russian disinformation efforts. In early December, Ukrainian officials reported that the Kremlin had intensified a disinformation campaign regarding potential diplomatic settlements to Russia’s war against Ukraine. These efforts reportedly focused on undermining negotiations between Ukraine and the United States.

Security analysts suggest this infiltration demonstrates Russia’s evolving hybrid warfare tactics, which combine traditional espionage with information operations designed to shape international perceptions and policy decisions.

The exposure of this operation underscores the challenges facing academic institutions and international organizations that must balance openness with security considerations. Universities and think tanks, traditionally oriented toward collaboration and knowledge exchange, have increasingly become targets for state-sponsored influence operations.

For Norway, a NATO member sharing a border with Russia, this incident raises additional security concerns about vulnerability to Russian influence operations, particularly in the strategically important Arctic region.

The case serves as a reminder that Russia’s information warfare extends far beyond social media and traditional propaganda outlets, penetrating institutions once considered largely separate from geopolitical competition.