U.S. Faces Complex Challenge in Securing Iran’s Enriched Uranium

When War Secretary Pete Hegseth was recently questioned about the possibility of U.S. forces securing enriched uranium stored at Iran’s Isfahan nuclear complex, he declined to provide specifics, citing operational security concerns.

This exchange highlighted a critical gap in the ongoing U.S.-Israeli air campaign against Iran: while airstrikes may damage nuclear infrastructure, they cannot resolve the fundamental question of who would physically secure Iran’s enriched uranium stockpile and how such an operation would unfold.

Intelligence assessments indicate Iran possesses a significant stockpile of uranium enriched to 60% purity, just short of the 90% weapons-grade threshold. This material could theoretically be utilized in multiple nuclear devices if further refined, though weaponization would require additional technical steps beyond enrichment.

“If the U.S. wants to secure Iran’s nuclear materials, it’s going to require a massive ground operation,” explained Kelsey Davenport, director of nonproliferation policy at the Arms Control Association, in comments to Fox News Digital.

According to Davenport, the highly enriched uranium believed to be stored at Isfahan presents particular challenges. The material appears to be deeply buried underground and contained in relatively mobile storage canisters. A successful security operation would require locating the full stockpile, accessing fortified subterranean facilities, and safely extracting or downblending the material.

“It’s not even clear the United States knows where all of the uranium is,” Davenport cautioned, noting that the mobility of storage containers raises concerns about material being moved or dispersed.

The Trump administration has consistently identified preventing Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons as a central objective of Operation Epic Fury. Senior officials argue that Iran strategically built up its ballistic missile arsenal partially as a deterrent shield, allowing the regime to advance its nuclear program while discouraging outside intervention.

To date, most U.S. military strikes have targeted missile launchers, air defenses, and conventional military assets rather than nuclear facilities directly. While dismantling missile systems may reduce Iran’s ability to shield a potential nuclear breakout, physically controlling the enriched uranium presents a separate and substantially more complex challenge.

The Limitations of Airpower

Defense experts acknowledge that degrading nuclear infrastructure from the air differs significantly from securing nuclear material. Airstrikes can destroy centrifuges, power systems, and support buildings, but enriched uranium stored in hardened underground facilities may remain intact unless physically secured, removed, or verifiably processed into less dangerous forms.

Any operation targeting nuclear material also carries safety risks that military planners must carefully consider. If storage containers of uranium hexafluoride gas were compromised, the material could pose serious chemical toxicity risks to personnel entering facilities without proper protective equipment.

Chuck DeVore, a former Reagan-era defense official with nuclear expertise, suggested that directly targeting the uranium stockpile might not be the current military priority.

“You don’t want to release the material into the surrounding areas and cause radioactive contamination,” DeVore explained, adding that deeply buried facilities present significant challenges for air campaigns. He also downplayed the immediacy of an Iranian nuclear breakout, arguing that weaponization would be difficult to execute undetected while under sustained U.S. air operations.

Securing the Material: Options and Requirements

Nonproliferation specialists emphasize that properly securing enriched uranium requires more than military force. Effective control necessitates verified accounting of all material, sustained access to storage sites, and either removal or downblending to lower enrichment levels suitable for civilian applications.

Davenport indicated that internationally monitored downblending would represent the safest option if political conditions permit such an approach.

“The IAEA remains the best entity to re-enter Iran, monitor the sites, and account for the enriched uranium,” she said, describing downblending as a relatively straightforward technical process compared to extracting and transporting highly enriched material in a contested environment.

Both potential pathways—physical seizure or internationally monitored reduction—depend on conditions that do not currently exist in the region. Administration officials maintain that dismantling Iran’s missile network weakens the country’s ability to shield nuclear activities while reducing immediate threats to U.S. forces and regional allies.

However, the fundamental challenge remains: destroying infrastructure can slow or disrupt a nuclear program, but physically locating, accounting for, and securing nuclear material requires sustained access, reliable intelligence, and ultimately, political conditions that enable such operations.

For now, while the administration maintains its commitment that Iran will not be allowed to obtain nuclear weapons, precisely how the enriched uranium would be secured remains an unanswered question with profound regional security implications.