Russian Influence Operations in Africa: Examining Evidence Critics Overlook

Russia’s African Disinformation Campaign Grows as Experts Debate Impact

Russia has significantly intensified its disinformation operations across Africa since 2019, according to mounting evidence from academics, government analysts, and civil society watchdogs. These Kremlin-backed campaigns aim to advance authoritarian narratives, deepen societal divisions, and undermine democratic institutions throughout the continent.

African governments, heads of state, locally-authored studies, fact-checking organizations, and civil society groups have increasingly documented Russia’s expanding influence through digital platforms and covert media operations. Despite this growing body of evidence, some analysts remain skeptical about the true scale and impact of these efforts.

The U.S. State Department recently uncovered a secret Russian operation involving RT (formerly Russia Today) and its “African Stream” network. This campaign utilized platforms like TikTok, Instagram, and YouTube to reach millions of African users, promoting anti-Western narratives and supporting Russian-backed authoritarian figures. It represents just one of at least eighty identified Kremlin campaigns targeting Africa.

In the Central African Republic, Russian influence operations have evolved from shadow campaigns to a deeply entrenched system. Former Central African journalist Ephrem Yalike, who once worked within Russian disinformation networks, exposed how Wagner Group-linked operations infiltrated local media through hidden intermediaries, financial incentives, and intimidation tactics.

Russia has invested heavily in developing a sophisticated infrastructure across Africa, including radio stations, television networks, duplicate websites, social media accounts, paid influencers, and on-the-ground support groups. These assets produce and distribute false content ranging from cartoons and TikTok videos to AI-generated voiceovers and fabricated news articles supposedly written by African journalists.

“The content they generate is strategically designed to exploit local grievances, inflame tensions, and weaken democratic institutions,” notes Dr. Mark Duerksen, a counter-foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI) expert advisor for Africa.

Despite the evidence, skepticism persists among some scholars and policy analysts. One group argues that Western emphasis on Russian disinformation distracts from Africa’s fundamental challenges: poor governance, violent extremism, and economic inequality. Another perspective, particularly from within Africa, views the focus on Russian influence as condescending to African political sophistication and agency.

Russian sympathizers, meanwhile, dismiss these concerns entirely, claiming Moscow’s information operations represent nothing unique or particularly threatening to the continent.

These misunderstandings often stem from outdated conceptions of disinformation. Modern Russian influence operations have evolved beyond simple false narratives to employ more sophisticated and deniable methods. Rather than using obviously fake accounts, they now utilize “spreader” networks and locally recruited influencers who amplify narratives while obscuring state involvement.

“These influence methods are incremental, often taking years to fully unfold, and require advanced training in computational networks to track,” explains Dr. Jason Warner, director of research at the U.S. Army’s Foreign Military Studies Office.

The impacts are real and concerning. Russian disinformation campaigns have already destabilized governments, undermined public health initiatives, and supported authoritarian agendas across Africa.

Countering these threats requires a comprehensive approach. African governments, civil society organizations, and media outlets are working to build capacity, but they need sustained support to be effective. This includes investing in training African counter-FIMI professionals—journalists, fact-checkers, cybersecurity experts, and media literacy educators—who can serve as frontline defenders of their information ecosystems.

Regional coordination is also essential. Formalizing networks through training hubs, cross-border investigative partnerships, and shared analytical frameworks would enhance the ability to track and counter evolving Russian tactics. The African Union and regional political organizations have key roles to play in coordinating these efforts.

While security agencies can contribute by securing communication channels and monitoring threats, their involvement should be limited to protecting the information space rather than controlling content. Counter-FIMI efforts remain most effective when civilian-led, with security actors in supporting roles.

Long-term resilience ultimately depends on strengthening democratic institutions that can withstand external manipulation, including independent media and civic engagement initiatives. With U.S. policies toward Africa under review, prioritizing resources for these efforts would help counter Russian influence while reinforcing stable information environments across the strategically significant continent.

“It is time to move the debate beyond questioning the existence of this threat and focus on practical steps needed to safeguard African democracy and sovereignty from foreign manipulation,” Warner concludes.