Russia-Iran Relationship Reveals More Transaction Than Alliance

In March 2026, as the smoke cleared over Tehran following the U.S.-Israeli campaign against Iran’s leadership, Russia’s response was strikingly restrained. Despite a 20-year strategic partnership treaty signed with Tehran just last year, Moscow limited its reaction to condemnation and calls for diplomacy.

Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov confirmed that Russia had received no request from Iran for military assistance. “There were no requests from Iran in this case,” Peskov told reporters on March 5th.

For analysts who study the relationship between Moscow and Tehran, the moment felt familiar. “The relationship has always been transactional,” said Ksenia Svetlova, executive director of the Regional Organization for Peace, Economy and Security (ROPES) and an associate fellow at Chatham House. “Russia does what serves its own interests.”

While Iran and Russia have moved closer in recent years—particularly after Moscow’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine—experts say the partnership has never resembled a true alliance. Instead, they say, it reflects a long history of cooperation shaped by convenience, rivalry and shifting geopolitical needs.

The Legacy of Historical Tensions

The uneasy relationship between the two powers stretches back nearly two centuries. In 1828, the Treaty of Turkmenchay forced Persia to cede large parts of the Caucasus to the Russian Empire after a military defeat. The treaty remains one of the most painful symbols of foreign domination in Iranian political memory.

In the twentieth century, Russia’s relationship with Iran shifted dramatically. Before the 1979 Islamic Revolution, Moscow maintained relatively stable ties with Iran under Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi. “It actually had good relations with the Shah who visited Moscow after World War II,” Svetlova said.

“But Communist Russia was very suspicious of Islamist Iran after the 1979 revolution,” added Svetlova. It was a mutual distrust; Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini denounced both Cold War superpowers, calling the United States the “Great Satan” and the Soviet Union the “Lesser Satan.”

Even during the Iran-Iraq War of the 1980s, the Soviet Union maintained ties with Tehran while simultaneously supplying weapons to Iraq, highlighting the transactional nature of the relationship that continues today.

The Drone Alliance

In recent years, geopolitical pressures pushed the two countries closer together. Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 created new military cooperation between Moscow and Tehran.

Though Russia and Iran have not shared a land border since the 1991 collapse of the Soviet Union, they remain “neighbors” via the Caspian Sea. This “blue border” became a vital artery in 2022 when Iran supplied the Shahed-series drones used in Ukraine, which Russia has deployed extensively in attacks on Ukrainian infrastructure.

Vice Adm. Robert S. Harward, a retired Navy SEAL and former deputy commander of U.S. Central Command, said the partnership has had direct consequences on the battlefield. “Sadly, the world is just now getting a taste of Iranian drones. But there’s one group that already knows them well, the Christians in Ukraine,” Harward said. “Close to 600 Ukrainian churches have been destroyed by Russian attacks, including from the Iranian Shahed drones.”

Russia’s dependence on Iranian drones during the early stages of the Ukraine war has diminished as Moscow built its own production capacity. A Washington Post report found that Russia has “transitioned from importing Iranian Shahed drones to mass-manufacturing them” under the name Geran-2, signaling a technological transfer rather than continued dependency.

Intelligence Sharing and Strategic Limits

War Secretary Pete Hegseth said Tuesday that Russia “should not be involved” in the escalating conflict between the United States, Israel and Iran, as reports emerged that Moscow has provided information that could help Iran identify U.S. military assets in the Middle East. Russia has not publicly confirmed these claims.

“I believe Russia is providing Iran intelligence to more effectively target Americans, our allies and partners in the CENTCOM region,” said Lt. Gen. Richard Y. Newton III, a retired Air Force officer who served as assistant vice chief of staff of the U.S. Air Force. “It’s absolutely clear Russia is not our friend.”

This intelligence sharing represents a deepening of cooperation that falls short of direct military involvement. “They are doing for the Iranians without spending money, spending troops or spending equipment,” Svetlova noted. “They share knowledge. They supplied the Iranians with a target list, basically, through their satellites – American targets, but also air targets in the Gulf and Iraq.”

Carrie Filipetti, executive director of the Vandenberg Coalition and a former deputy assistant secretary of state, argued that Russia’s continued use of Iranian drones against Ukrainian targets underscores the depth of the military relationship, while its calls for restraint in the current conflict highlight a fundamental contradiction. “If Russia were serious about peace, we would see a ceasefire with Ukraine months ago,” she said.

Filipetti remains skeptical of Moscow’s role as a mediator. “The idea that Russia would call on the U.S. and Israel to cease military operations against the regime in Iran and suggest that we should negotiate is absurd,” she said.

Pragmatic Partnership

Ultimately, Newton argued that Russia’s actions should be viewed through the lens of President Vladimir Putin’s broader geopolitical goals. “Putin only does what serves Putin, and right now escalating the war in the Middle East and driving up oil prices only serves his interests so he can continue to fund his war machine against Ukraine,” he said.

As tensions in the Middle East continue to evolve, the Russia-Iran relationship illustrates how modern geopolitical alliances are often shaped more by pragmatism than ideology—a partnership of convenience rather than conviction. Both nations benefit from their cooperation against Western interests, but neither appears willing to risk significant resources to defend the other when core interests are not aligned.