The Hidden Cost of Victory: Behind the Missile Defense Success in Middle East Conflict

U.S., Israeli and allied forces have maintained an impressive record of intercepting more than 90% of Iranian missiles and drones during the ongoing conflict, but this headline success masks a growing strategic concern that could reshape the war’s trajectory: the cost and sustainability of the defense itself.

According to a new report from the Jewish Institute for National Security of America (JINSA), the multilayered regional air defense system built through years of coordination has proven highly effective. However, beneath this success lies a widening economic imbalance that military experts warn could become increasingly problematic.

“Iran’s least expensive weapons are proving the most disruptive and are draining costly U.S. and Israeli interceptors,” notes the JINSA report, highlighting a critical trend that has emerged during weeks of conflict.

White House press secretary Karoline Leavitt confirmed the defensive success in a recent briefing, stating that “more than 9,000 enemy targets have been struck to date” and that “Iran’s ballistic missile attacks and drone attacks are down by roughly 90%.” U.S. forces have also destroyed over 140 Iranian naval vessels, including nearly 50 mine layers.

The current air defense architecture integrates U.S., Israeli and Arab systems with shared radar coverage, early warning systems, and pre-positioned assets that allow multiple countries to coordinate their defense efforts. A surge of U.S. military assets before the war began—including Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) batteries, Patriot systems, two carrier strike groups, and approximately 200 fighter aircraft—helped absorb Iran’s initial attacks.

But military analysts caution that focusing solely on interception percentages misses the bigger picture.

“Overall high missile and drone interception rates have been important but only tell part of the story,” said Ari Cicurel, associate director of foreign policy at JINSA and author of the report. “Iran came into this war with a deliberate plan to dismantle the architecture that makes those intercepts possible. It has struck energy infrastructure to upset markets and used cluster munitions to achieve higher hit rates.”

The Economics of Asymmetric Warfare

At the heart of the problem is a stark economic imbalance between offensive and defensive capabilities.

“There needs to be a change in the equation,” said Danny Citrinowicz, a Middle East and national security expert at the Institute for National Security Studies. “The Iranians are launching drones that cost around $30,000, and we are using missiles that cost millions of dollars to intercept them. That gap is a very problematic one.”

The same principle applies to ballistic missiles. “Building a missile in Iran may cost a few hundred thousand dollars, while the interceptor costs millions, especially when we talk about systems like Arrow,” Citrinowicz explained. “It’s easier and quicker to produce missiles than it is to build interceptors. That’s not a secret.”

This cost disparity becomes increasingly significant as the conflict extends into weeks and potentially months, with stockpiles of interceptors facing depletion across the region.

Interceptor Depletion Concerns Growing

The JINSA report raises alarm about dwindling interceptor inventories throughout the Middle East. Gulf states have already used significant portions of their defensive stockpiles, with estimates suggesting Bahrain may have expended up to 87% of its Patriot missiles. The United Arab Emirates and Kuwait have used roughly 75% of their interceptors, while Qatar has used approximately 40%.

Israel is also experiencing mounting pressure, though officials have not publicly confirmed stockpile levels. The report notes signs of rationing, including decisions not to intercept certain cluster-munition threats to conserve more advanced interceptors for higher-priority targets.

Iran has adapted its tactics accordingly, shifting from large-scale barrages to smaller, more frequent attacks designed to maintain constant pressure while gradually depleting defensive resources. These persistent salvos, even when limited in size, force defenders to remain on high alert and continue expending valuable interceptors.

The Drone Challenge

Unmanned aerial vehicles pose a unique challenge compared to ballistic missiles. Unlike missiles that rely on large launchers and leave detectable signatures, drones can be launched from mobile platforms and fly at low altitudes that make them harder for radar systems to detect.

The Shahed-136 drone, for instance, weighs approximately 200 kilograms and launches from an angled rail mounted on a pickup truck, after which the crew can quickly relocate. This simple launch profile makes it easier for Iran to disperse, conceal and fire under pressure, according to the JINSA report.

Iran has also incorporated lessons from the war in Ukraine, deploying more advanced drones, including those guided by fiber-optic cables that are immune to electronic jamming, and faster variants powered by jet engines. These innovations complicate interception timelines and increase the likelihood of successful strikes.

Despite these challenges, experts emphasize that the defensive architecture has not failed. “The architecture has held, but the trajectory is moving in the wrong direction,” Cicurel said. “Reversing it requires moving assets to where the pressure is greatest, hunting Iranian launchers and drones more aggressively, and convoying ships through the Gulf.”

Even with high interception rates, the broader impact of the attacks is being felt economically. Iranian strikes on energy infrastructure and shipping have driven oil prices higher and disrupted traffic through the Strait of Hormuz, demonstrating that air defense alone cannot prevent economic and strategic consequences.

As the conflict continues, the fundamental question becomes one of production capacity. “As long as the war continues,” Citrinowicz said, “the key question will be whether Iran can produce missiles faster than we can produce interceptors.”