Romania’s Elections: Key Tech Lessons for the European Union

In a dramatic turn that tested Europe’s digital defenses, Romania’s 2025 presidential election evolved from a domestic political contest into a cautionary tale about electoral integrity in the digital age.

The crisis began in November 2024 when Romania’s Constitutional Court took the extraordinary step of annulling the first round of presidential elections following credible reports of foreign interference and campaign irregularities. Cãlin Georgescu, a pro-Russian candidate who had shown just 5% support in polls, unexpectedly surged to first place with substantial help from digital influencers and TikTok’s recommendation algorithm. The platform, which counts 9 million Romanian users, failed to detect or label campaign materials and proved ineffective at curbing coordinated disinformation campaigns.

This failure prompted the European Commission to launch a formal investigation into TikTok under the Digital Services Act (DSA), examining the platform’s handling of election-related risks. Six months later, that investigation continues without resolution.

The electoral annulment triggered profound consequences in Romania. Public trust in democratic institutions collapsed, social polarization deepened, and digital spaces became the primary battleground for political messaging. When voters returned to the polls on May 4, 2025, they faced an information environment saturated with manipulation tactics.

George Simion, the 38-year-old nationalist leading the far-right AUR party, conducted his campaign almost exclusively via social media and secured 40% of the vote. Nicușor Dan, the 55-year-old independent mayor of Bucharest, emerged as the front-runner with 20%, outpacing the coalition-backed candidate Crin Antonescu. The result signaled a clear rejection of Romania’s political establishment and prompted Prime Minister Marcel Ciolacu’s resignation.

The second round of voting unfolded under intense scrutiny. Civil society organizations and watchdog groups repeatedly warned that Romania’s information ecosystem had become weaponized with personal attacks, fear-mongering, and false narratives targeting Nicușor Dan. Bot networks and coordinated amplification tactics flooded TikTok and Facebook, yet platform enforcement efforts appeared inconsistent and inadequate to address the scale of the threat.

Meanwhile, the European Commission released preliminary findings confirming that TikTok had violated the DSA in a separate investigation concerning its advertising repository. The platform failed to disclose political ad sponsors, targeting methods, and funding sources—omissions that severely hampered real-time tracking of influence operations in Romania.

Election day on May 18 brought another digital disruption when Telegram’s CEO Pavel Durov sent a message to all Romanian users alleging French interference in the election. Though ultimately ineffective, this unprecedented move represented a new form of digital meddling: platform owners directly inserting themselves into national political processes without accountability. Telegram holds approximately 26% of Romania’s messaging market.

Despite these extraordinary circumstances, pro-European Nicușor Dan prevailed with 53.6% of the vote. While his victory demonstrates democratic resilience against digital manipulation, it also reflects broad public desire to move beyond the political paralysis and toxic digital environment that defined the previous six months.

Romania’s experience serves as both warning and lesson for Europe. While digital interference formed the storm clouds, the country’s existing political instability and economic volatility created fertile ground for public distrust. The election revealed deep fractures within Romanian society, many of which surfaced primarily in online discussions.

The crisis highlights the inadequacy of current safeguards. The EU’s voluntary Code of Conduct on Disinformation has proven insufficient, with platforms like Telegram refusing to participate. The Digital Services Act represents progress but moves too slowly—even “accelerated” investigations like the one opened for Romania’s annulled December elections remain unresolved months later.

Attempts at self-regulation, such as TikTok’s Electoral Centre introduced just ten days before the May elections, provided little transparency despite the platform’s claims of increased Romanian-language content moderation. Similarly, Meta’s quarterly transparency reports fail to address real-time concerns during electoral periods.

“Brussels must recognize Romania’s experience for what it is: a frontline preview of challenges facing democracies across Europe,” warns Dr. Roxana Radu, Associate Professor of Digital Technologies and Public Policy. “Without urgent, robust, and agile oversight mechanisms, electoral integrity will continue to be a weak link in the democratic chain.”

As President-elect Dan prepares to address Romania’s economic deficit and regional security challenges with a government likely led by reformist Ilie Bolojan, the broader lesson remains clear: in the digital age, electoral integrity cannot be separated from platform accountability.