Brazil’s Disinformation Crisis: The Battle for Electoral Integrity

The rise of disinformation in Brazil’s electoral politics has reached unprecedented levels during the 2022 presidential election, transforming from a concerning trend in 2018 to a full-blown campaign strategy. Despite efforts by civil society and judiciary bodies to combat false information, the problem has only intensified.

When President Jair Bolsonaro first campaigned in 2018, his use of multi-million-dollar operations to distribute false content through WhatsApp attracted significant attention. Following that election, Brazilian authorities launched formal inquiries into the financing and distribution of mass-messaging disinformation campaigns, while fact-checking agencies were established to counter the spread of misinformation.

However, these efforts proved insufficient against the tide of falsehoods that characterized the 2022 election cycle. Bolsonaro’s campaign refined its approach, establishing what Brazilian media dubbed the “Office of Hate” – a sophisticated operation supporting pro-Bolsonaro blogs and social media accounts that disseminate misinformation while attacking critics of the president.

“The campaign has weaponized social media in unprecedented ways,” explains political analyst Maria Santos from the University of São Paulo. “From questioning voting machines to accusing opponent Lula of satanism, the range of false claims has been extraordinary in both volume and audacity.”

The Bolsonaro campaign has strategically leveraged various digital platforms to present different personas tailored to specific audiences. By engaging social media influencers, from Christian content creators to gaming personalities, the campaign expanded its reach across demographic groups, particularly among younger voters.

Meanwhile, Bolsonaro has skillfully framed concerns about disinformation as attacks on free speech. His administration has positioned itself as “anti-censorship,” even pardoning a congressman convicted by the Supreme Court for anti-democratic actions. This narrative has resonated with supporters while creating barriers to meaningful regulation of false content.

The opposition has not remained above the fray. Former president Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva’s campaign, with support from congressman André Janones, has also employed misleading tactics, including decontextualized information about Bolsonaro. However, analysts note that Lula’s campaign engagement with disinformation pales in comparison to the systematic approach employed by Bolsonaro’s team.

Brazil’s Superior Electoral Court (TSE), the highest authority in the country’s electoral justice system, has attempted to stem the tide of falsehoods. TSE chair Alexandre de Moraes reported receiving ten times more disinformation claims in 2022 compared to the 2018 election cycle. The court implemented a comprehensive program aimed at promoting digital literacy while identifying and removing false information.

Court data shows 384 registered decisions regarding fake news as of late October 2022, with 52% resulting in content removal. The judiciary has also enacted specific resolutions for the elections, requiring candidates to verify information and granting opponents the right to correct false claims.

In a controversial move, the Supreme Court upheld a resolution giving the court expanded powers to combat election-related misinformation. The measure requires platforms to remove disinformation within two hours of a judicial decision – reduced to one hour on election day – and allows for suspension of repeat offenders.

“These judicial efforts represent an important step, but they remain limited compared to the scale of the problem,” notes digital rights advocate Carlos Pereira. “Major tech companies continue allowing explicit disinformation on their platforms, and encrypted channels like WhatsApp and Telegram present significant regulatory challenges.”

President Bolsonaro has undermined these efforts by criticizing the court and casting doubt on election integrity through unproven fraud claims. He has called for military oversight of elections – outside their constitutional role – and targeted Supreme Court ministers, including filing for the impeachment of its chair.

These tactics exploit existing societal mistrust in institutions. A recent survey revealed that 52% of Brazilians have limited or no trust in the Supreme Court, while confidence in traditional media has also declined. This erosion of institutional trust creates fertile ground for misinformation to flourish.

Brazil’s struggle with election-related disinformation reflects a broader global challenge. Similar patterns emerged in Colombia’s 2022 presidential election and Chile’s constitutional referendum, where disinformation campaigns significantly impacted democratic processes.

As democracies worldwide face these threats, the Brazilian experience underscores the need for comprehensive, context-specific approaches to combating disinformation. While judicial interventions represent one important component, effective solutions will require coordinated action from governments, civil society, and technology companies to address this evolving challenge to democratic integrity.