Far-Right Digital Networks Expand Across Latin America, Eye Mexico

Brazil was the testing ground for the Latin American far-right’s digital arsenal. The strategy proved remarkably effective, propelling a provocative and virtually unknown congressman named Jair Messias Bolsonaro to Brazil’s presidency in January 2019.

Four years later, the spotlight shifted to Javier Milei, a vociferous Argentine economist with distinctive curly hair who rode similar digital tactics to power. The far-right phenomenon continues to spread, now growing in Chile under Johannes Kaiser and attempting to establish a foothold in Mexico, where it’s still searching for a figurehead.

The playbook remains consistent across borders: digital armies spread far-right rhetoric outside traditional media channels. On platforms like X, TikTok, Instagram, and Facebook, as well as through streaming programs and digital newspapers, these networks call for revolt and civil disobedience—sometimes even advocating for coups—while organizing “spontaneous” demonstrations against the establishment. One such protest occurred on November 15 in Mexico City, targeting President Claudia Sheinbaum’s administration.

In Mexico, the far right has historically lacked significant popular support and institutional presence. Currently, only two far-right groups are seeking to become political parties before the 2027 midterm elections. One is led by actor Eduardo Verástegui, who briefly maintained a relationship with Argentina’s President Milei until an unexpected exchange of insults on X in October ended their alliance and led to the cancellation of the Conservative Political Action Conference (CPAC) scheduled for Mexico this month.

Without electoral representation, Mexico’s conservative movement exists primarily in the digital realm. It was there that calls for the recent demonstration—supposedly initiated by “Generation Z” members—emerged. Although presented as a spontaneous movement similar to youth-led protests in Nepal, Madagascar, and Morocco, an investigation by Infodemia, a Mexican government unit analyzing disinformation, concluded it was actually a “coordinated digital strategy.” The report identifies influencers, opposition figures, and accounts linked to the Atlas Network—an ultranationalist organization founded in the early 1980s with operations in over 100 countries—as orchestrating the campaign. According to the findings, more than 90 million Mexican pesos (approximately $5 million) were spent in the last six weeks to promote the march.

The official investigation also indirectly implicates Ricardo Salinas Pliego, owner of TV Azteca. Two weeks ago, the Mexican Supreme Court ruled against the businessman after years of litigation, ordering him to pay 50 billion pesos (nearly $3 billion) in back taxes. This setback intensified speculation about Salinas Pliego’s alleged role in digital campaigns criticizing Sheinbaum during her tenure as head of Mexico City’s government from 2018 to 2023.

Infodemia traces the recent campaign’s origins to early October, when Azteca Noticias published a report on Generation Z protests occurring beyond Mexico. Subsequently, dozens of social media accounts emerged with names like “generacionz_mx” or “somosgeneracionzmx,” all promoting a November 15 march in Mexico City. Nearly 200 accounts pushed the protest on TikTok, with 50 created or reactivated during that period. On Facebook, more than 350 groups discussed the demonstration, with several administered from abroad.

The tone of messaging shifted abruptly during October. Following the assassination of a mayor in Michoacán state on November 1, the narrative escalated to calls for the president’s recall and accusations that the federal government was unable to address violence. Infodemia argues this change was orchestrated.

The report highlights the presence of Atlas Network bots and mentions Argentine digital strategist Fernando Cerimedo, who until recently managed Milei’s digital campaign. Cerimedo is well-known in South America—his name appeared over 60 times in the Brazilian police investigation into the coup plot against President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, which led to Bolsonaro’s conviction in September. While Cerimedo was ultimately cleared of involvement in the coup plot, investigators noted he had circulated “unfounded content” questioning Brazil’s electoral system.

Bolsonaro’s movement originated on social media, far from mainstream Brazilian media’s attention. There, the anti-establishment and anti-corruption rhetoric of a congressman known primarily for provocations captivated millions of citizens in 2018. Most Brazilians voted for the retired army captain that year, united by weariness with traditional politics and visceral hatred of the Workers’ Party. Lula was sidelined, imprisoned on corruption charges later dismissed.

The Bolsonaro family was acutely aware of the internet’s crucial role in their electoral success, particularly WhatsApp messaging. On inauguration day, Bolsonaro’s son Carlos—a city councilman and digital campaign strategist—accompanied his father in the Rolls-Royce to the presidential palace. They built a far-right political movement across Facebook, Twitter (now X), YouTube, and TikTok that decimated much of Brazil’s traditional right and co-opted most remaining conservatives.

Bolsonaro launched a weekly Facebook program where, reminiscent of Hugo Chávez’s “Aló Presidente” TV show, he invited ministers to showcase government achievements. The digital militias Carlos Bolsonaro created functioned like a well-oiled machine, forming networks with influential politicians and allied media to launch synchronized attacks on rivals, silence critics, and shape the national debate. The ecosystem even spawned a right-wing alternative to Netflix, producing content centered on the movement’s themes of God, country, and family.

This digital environment, fueled by biased or false information, created conditions for thousands to believe Bolsonaro had been robbed of the 2022 presidential election. Supporters camped outside military barracks for two months demanding intervention before storming government buildings in Brasília. Hundreds now serve lengthy sentences for participating in the attempted coup, while Bolsonaro awaits the terms of his 27-year prison sentence.

Before Bolsonaro’s downfall, Cerimedo had returned to Buenos Aires, where since 2012 he operated La Derecha Diario (“The Daily Right”), a major digital propagator of far-right ideas and misinformation across Latin America. While his website doesn’t attract massive traffic, his X account has over half a million loyal followers who amplify his message.

In June 2021, Cerimedo partnered with Javier Negre, a Spanish media figure who had recognized Milei’s political potential early on. After years of activity, Cerimedo eventually left La Derecha Diario and broke with the Milei administration over communication strategy disagreements. He now serves as communications advisor to Bolivia’s newly-elected president, Rodrigo Paz.

Negre continues operating in Buenos Aires after brief stints in the United States and Israel. His influence extended to Mexico when Salinas Pliego reportedly offered to finance a local version of La Derecha Diario. Many Mexican influencers identified by Infodemia as promoting the November 15 demonstration have no prior political involvement—they’re content creators focused on makeup, video games, or music who suddenly began posting support messages days before the event.

While youth-led protests have toppled governments elsewhere, online mobilization in Mexico appears to lack sufficient impact. Nevertheless, President Sheinbaum ordered protective metal fencing around the National Palace and historical buildings, even as the movement’s social media accounts shared instructions for dismantling these barriers.