UK Government Clarifies Role of Counter Disinformation Unit Amid Media Scrutiny

Responding to recent media reports, the UK government has issued a comprehensive explanation of its Counter Disinformation Unit (CDU), detailing the unit’s purpose, operations and accountability frameworks.

The CDU, established in 2019 within the former Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport, now operates under the Department for Science, Innovation and Technology following governmental restructuring in February. The unit was created to address the growing threat of misinformation and disinformation in the digital age.

According to the government, disinformation is defined as “the deliberate creation and spreading of false and/or manipulated information intended to deceive and mislead people,” while misinformation refers to the inadvertent spread of false information. Officials note that while these phenomena aren’t new, social media and modern technologies have dramatically accelerated their spread and impact.

The CDU’s mandate focuses on content targeting UK audiences that poses risks to public health, public safety, or national security. During the COVID-19 pandemic, the unit countered dangerous claims suggesting bleach as a cure for the virus or encouraging people to burn 5G masts. More recently, it has focused on Russian disinformation related to the invasion of Ukraine, including denials of mass casualties in Bucha and the bombing of a maternity hospital in Mariupol.

Government officials emphasize that the CDU uses only publicly available data, including social media content, to understand disinformation trends. “It does not, and has never, monitored individuals and all data is anonymised wherever possible,” the statement clarifies.

In addressing concerns about freedom of expression, the government stresses that the CDU does not monitor political debate or refer content from journalists, politicians, or political parties to social media companies. When harmful content is identified, it may be referred to platforms only if it poses “a demonstrable risk to public health, safety, or national security” and is assessed to breach the platform’s terms of service.

The statement notes that since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, more than 95% of referrals made by the CDU have related to state-backed disinformation.

The government also addressed misconceptions about the unit’s transparency, stating that the CDU’s work was publicly announced in a press release and has been discussed more than 200 times in Parliament, including scrutiny by the DCMS Select Committee through public hearings.

The clarification also covered the now-defunct Rapid Response Unit (RRU), which operated from 2018 until August 2022. Unlike the CDU, the RRU functioned essentially as a “digital cuttings service” within the government Communications Service, identifying trends in media and social media coverage to help departments understand how their announcements were being reported and received.

Officials rejected claims that the RRU created “dossiers” on individuals, stating it only produced summaries on how particular topics or policies were being reported. “There are no dossiers on journalists or politicians created or held by government as a result of the activities of any media monitoring,” the statement affirmed.

The explanation comes as part of the government’s broader strategy to address online safety concerns, which includes the Online Safety Bill and the Media Literacy Strategy. These initiatives aim to require major platforms to maintain transparent terms of service and consistently enforce them, while providing legal protections against arbitrary content removal.