Why Haven’t Russian Citizens Mobilized to Oppose the Ukraine Conflict?

In the aftermath of the Soviet Union’s collapse, Russia faced the challenging task of forging a new national identity. This process required navigating the contradictions of its past while finding a path that could both integrate with the West and preserve Russian distinctiveness.

The Ukraine War has fundamentally altered this equation, crystallizing public attitudes and consolidating support for a set of national ideas. This shift has contributed significantly to Russia’s resilience throughout the conflict, frustrating Western hopes that economic pressure and battlefield losses would erode support for both the war and President Vladimir Putin.

When Boris Yeltsin became the first post-Soviet president, he sought a clean break from communism, basing his leadership on rejecting the country’s—and his own—past. This approach left Russia with what analysts describe as a profound sense of negative identity. Vladimir Putin’s ascension to power initially brought a more positive vision focused on integration with the West, albeit on Russian terms and with Russian independence as a non-negotiable condition. However, this vision eventually collapsed amid irreconcilable differences between Russian and Western interests.

For years, the state struggled to articulate a cohesive identity that could define Russia’s uniqueness. Only World War II—referred to in Russia as the “Great Patriotic War”—emerged as a potential unifier, with most Russians expressing pride in their country’s role. The conflict acquired an almost religious significance within official narratives.

When Russia launched its invasion of Ukraine in 2022, many Russians initially responded with disbelief, confusion, and bewilderment. The public was unprepared for war, and most people focused on navigating personal challenges rather than supporting a national cause.

Nearly four years later, the situation has changed dramatically. Fueled by state propaganda and genuine resistance to perceived Western hostility, many ordinary Russians have developed a sense of pride in their nation’s resilience. Western expressions of contempt toward Russian people and culture—carefully highlighted by state-controlled media—have further reinforced this sentiment.

The Russian public struggles to view the situation from alternative perspectives or acknowledge legitimate Western concerns. For example, few Russians connect negative U.S. attitudes toward their country with the Kremlin’s documented interference in the 2016 U.S. presidential election, preferring to attribute such hostility to pre-existing prejudices.

Today, patriotism appears ascendant throughout Russian society. Military recruitment continues steadily, with men willing to serve—albeit for substantially higher wages than before the war. The grassroots “Help the Army” movement, supported primarily by women and pensioners, shows no signs of diminishing. Speaking against this tide has become both socially unacceptable and potentially dangerous.

Despite being the aggressor in Ukraine, many Russians view the conflict as defensive and inevitable. The perception of external threat has united much of the nation, with anti-Western sentiment becoming pervasive. A significant portion of Russians now believe the West intends harm to their country unless Russia maintains sufficient strength for self-protection.

This shift in national identity extends beyond the war itself. The Russian economy, despite being the most heavily sanctioned globally, has experienced sustained growth for three consecutive years. While inflation remains a concern, there is widespread optimism about the future. The war has stimulated innovation across both state and private sectors, with technological advancements receiving heavy publicity, even if not all developments represent genuine breakthroughs.

Russia’s distinctive development model forms another pillar of this evolving identity. Russians have come to expect extensive state obligations, significant public investment, affordable utilities, and low taxes—all elements of an implicit social contract between citizens and government. Many Russians believe their Western counterparts lack similar advantages.

The nation is also experiencing what some observers describe as a cultural renaissance. Initially shocked by the “cancellation” of Russian culture in Western countries, which many perceived as collective punishment, Russians have increasingly turned inward. Major cities have seen the opening of numerous theaters, art galleries, and cultural venues catering to growing domestic demand.

The exodus of approximately 170 cultural figures at the war’s start—including iconic performers like Alla Pugacheva and acclaimed actress Chulpan Khamatova—initially disturbed educated Russians. However, their departure created opportunities for others, such as patriotic pop star “Shaman” and actor Yura Borisov, who starred in the Oscar-winning film “Anora.” Reports of struggling Russian émigrés facing cultural barriers and limited audiences abroad have generated derision among those who remained.

Russia’s rejection of what it terms “woke” ideology has become another defining characteristic, with the state presenting itself as the guardian of traditional European values. This positioning appeals even to many liberal Russians who once aspired to join Western civilization but feel alienated by its contemporary evolution.

Today’s Russia differs significantly from the country that entered the war in 2022. With greater social cohesion and confidence in its viability as an independent nation, Russia shows little sign of succumbing to Western pressure. While these changes may lead to profound long-term shifts in Russian identity, their immediate effect is to sustain public willingness to continue the war indefinitely.