Journalists Targeted in Pro-Russian Disinformation Campaigns

Falsified claims, fabricated quotes, and inaccurate reporting can destroy a journalist’s credibility and, for some, even their career. But what happens when a journalist finds their name and photo on a story they never even wrote?

This is becoming an increasingly common occurrence, as part of campaigns orchestrated by pro-Russian disinformation actors — some of which fit into the Storm-1516 operation, a Russian propagandist group that spreads false narratives about Ukraine and the West online.

As part of this strategy, the work of legitimate news outlets — from Euronews to the BBC and ABC News — is impersonated, while journalists’ bylines are also stolen.

One journalist who found himself at the heart of such a campaign is Romain Fiaschetti, an entertainment reporter from the south of France. In June, he received an unexpected Facebook request from a Paris-based gynecologist asking if he had published an article claiming that Orano, a French nuclear waste company, was secretly bribing Armenian officials to dispose of France’s waste.

“I saw my name and my headshot on the story’s byline, except I never wrote it,” Fiaschetti told Euronews’ verification team, The Cube.

The fabricated story alleged that Orano had begun shipping toxic waste to Armenia after transferring money to a foundation connected to Anna Hakobyan, wife of Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan. These allegations are false—French law prohibits the transfer of waste to foreign countries, and both Armenian authorities and Orano have denied the claims.

The article appeared on the now-suspended CourrierFrance24 website, a name cleverly combining two legitimate French media outlets: Courrier International and France 24. While the exact origin remains difficult to trace, the false claims were amplified by Azerbaijani media and pro-Russian social media accounts linked to Storm-1516.

“The original site had five or six pages of articles bearing my name,” Fiaschetti said. “Two of my colleagues’ bylines were also impersonated.” In the days that followed, he began receiving congratulatory messages from Azerbaijani journalists praising his “excellent investigation.”

Fearing potential threats from people angered by the story, Fiaschetti posted social media disclaimers and filed a police complaint for identity theft. “I wrote some articles a few years ago about Putin and his wife, but it’s not my main reporting area, so I don’t understand: why me?” he wondered.

Guillaume Kuster, founder of CheckFirst—a Finnish company that tracks disinformation and foreign influence operations—explained that these techniques are less sophisticated than many believe. “People often view Russian or other influence operations as something very intricate and elaborate, but most of the time it’s very manual and is carried out by companies comparable to PR firms,” Kuster told The Cube, adding that such campaigns can be mounted for as little as $10 or $12 per month.

Freelance arts reporter Helen Brown, who writes for several publications including The Telegraph, had a similar experience. She was shocked to discover her photo attached to a story alleging that a Ukrainian anti-corruption official had fled to Europe with evidence of President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s supposed involvement in a €1.2 billion luxury property embezzlement scheme.

The story appeared on a website called “London Telegraph”—mimicking the legitimate British newspaper—under the byline of “Charlotte Davies,” but with Brown’s photo. “As a journalist you have to put your profile out there, but as much as sharing my photograph and identity online gives me credibility, I realized that it can also be manipulated to create a false identity,” Brown said.

Sometimes those actively working to combat disinformation become targets themselves. Radu Dumitrescu, a Romanian journalist who covers politics and electoral interference for Romania Insider, found his name attached to a story falsely claiming that Moldovan President Maia Sandu had embezzled $2.6 million in USAID funds—part of a broader disinformation campaign targeting Sandu ahead of Moldova’s September elections.

“I know these things happen, but you never expect it to happen to you,” Dumitrescu said. “Unfortunately, we have not yet taken any legal action to take the website down; our team is small. We don’t really have the resources to start or maintain a legal battle for that long.”

This propaganda tactic of flipping the narrative is common. Benoit Viktine, former Moscow correspondent for Le Monde, discovered his name on an article claiming that French President Emmanuel Macron had spent a fortune on a luxury war bunker in preparation for World War III. Ironically, Viktine had previously reported on the bunker Putin sought refuge in during the COVID-19 pandemic.

Kuster emphasized the importance of journalists taking action when their identities are stolen. “Journalists should notify the platforms that their name or their organization’s name was unduly used,” he advised. “The EU Digital Services Act mandates that platforms have notice and action procedures in place. These measures are tools that exist to try and slow down these propaganda actions.”