Russia Increases State Television Budget by 54% as Kremlin Strengthens Propaganda Machine

Russia plans to dramatically increase its funding for national television by 54% in its 2026 budget, allocating more than 106 billion rubles (approximately 53 billion hryvnia) to strengthen what analysts describe as the Kremlin’s expanding propaganda apparatus.

Media analysts point to this budget increase as evidence of the Russian government’s growing reliance on state-controlled media to shape public opinion, particularly regarding its ongoing war against Ukraine and potential future conflicts.

“The Russian State is entirely based on ideology. And one of the key factors promoting this ideology is, of course, the media,” explains Olena Holub, an analyst at the Mass Information Institute. “This ideological component will continue increasing as long as Russia continues to exist.”

According to Roman Tsymbaliuk, who served as UNIAN’s special correspondent in Russia from 2008 to 2021, the transformation of Russian media into state propaganda tools began around 2010 but accelerated dramatically after the 2014 annexation of Crimea.

“Now everyone somehow believes it has always been this way. Nothing of the sort. This is purely Putin’s story, how they made Nazis from Russians,” Tsymbaliuk told Suspilne Krym. “People are simply brainwashed. It’s like a cult, indeed. And yes, Crimea became the trigger.”

Tsymbaliuk notes that before 2014, Russian television still maintained some semblance of editorial independence, occasionally allowing uncomfortable questions to be directed at President Vladimir Putin. However, the occupation of Crimea became a rallying point that united Russian society around the concept of territorial expansion.

“From 2014 to 2022, Russia went through a period when there was no need to convince people; it was only necessary to form the ‘right priorities,'” Tsymbaliuk explained.

In occupied territories like Crimea, Russian propaganda follows a distinct strategy. According to Holub, authorities work systematically to eliminate Ukraine from the information space entirely. Even when reporting on Ukrainian drone attacks in Crimea, Russian media outlets refer to “enemy drones” without specifying their Ukrainian origin.

“They want to eliminate Ukraine in every way possible, to strip the minds of the Crimeans of it so that they don’t mention it at all,” Holub said, describing the psychological tactics employed by Russian media controllers.

The Russian government has established localized versions of major state media outlets in occupied regions. “Krym-24” operates as a division of “Russia-24,” while KRYM RIA functions as an extension of Novosti RIA.

Iryna Siedova, a researcher at the Crimean Human Rights Group, explains that this increased media presence stems from Russian authorities’ fears of Ukrainian resistance movements. “They are trying to use their aggressive propaganda and hate speech to suppress this resistance, intimidate people, and win over those who have doubts,” she said.

After Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, new propaganda channels emerged in occupied territories. In Crimea, the Telegram channel “Krymskiy Smersh” (Crimean Death Squad) was launched by Alieksandr Talipov, reportedly with FSB support. According to Siedova, such platforms openly call for identifying and targeting individuals who support Ukraine.

“This is pretty harsh rhetoric from these Crimean sub-bloggers and propagandists because they know there is resistance there and that not everyone is loyal to them,” Siedova noted.

In Kherson region, which was temporarily occupied following the 2022 invasion, Russian forces immediately blocked Ukrainian television channels and established Russian alternatives. Journalist Oleh Baturin observed that while Russian propaganda claims Ukraine “does not exist,” it paradoxically devotes extensive coverage to demonizing it.

“They say that we are all bloody, bloodthirsty, terrible, and that Ukraine does not exist at all. At the same time, they constantly pay a lot of attention to this non-existent country,” Baturin said.

Analysts are increasingly concerned about Russian media’s role in preparing domestic audiences for potential future conflicts. Holub notes a troubling trend of Russian television discussing possible confrontations with NATO and European countries.

“They are preparing Russian society for a possible conflict with Europe and NATO. There is a lot of talk in the Russian mainstream media about possible forms of attack or aggression,” she warned.

Since the full-scale invasion, many Russian media outlets have faced international sanctions, with their offices in Western countries closed and key propagandists banned from entry. Meanwhile, Ukrainian human rights organizations are gathering evidence for a case at the International Criminal Court in The Hague regarding Russian media’s systematic calls for genocide and incitement to hatred.