Russia’s Propaganda Machine Finds New Ways to Circumvent EU Sanctions

European Union sanctions against Russian state-run media outlets have forced the Kremlin to adapt its propaganda strategy, revealing a sophisticated network of workarounds that continue to spread disinformation throughout Europe, according to recent research.

In March 2022, following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the EU imposed sanctions against prominent Russian propaganda outlets RT and Sputnik. The sanctions list eventually expanded to include more subtle “soft power” platforms like New Eastern Outlook and the SPAS television channel.

Despite these restrictions, Moscow has developed multiple mechanisms to ensure its content still reaches European audiences. Research by the Centre for Democracy and Rule of Law reveals that RT France remained accessible in France and Belgium through alternative domains, mirror sites, and content aggregators that automatically reproduced sanctioned material.

The messaging platform Telegram initially emerged as a crucial tool in Russia’s information warfare arsenal. The platform’s historically minimal content moderation policies created what researchers describe as a “safe haven” for Russian propaganda operations.

“The first migration wave of Russian propaganda to Telegram began in 2021, coinciding with tightening policies on other platforms like Twitter, Facebook, and YouTube,” said researchers. A second surge occurred in early 2022 following the EU sanctions, with RT and Sputnik France actively promoting their Telegram channels before the ban took effect.

However, Telegram’s status as a propaganda sanctuary began to erode in December 2023 when the platform started blocking access to numerous Russian government resources for EU users.

The Kremlin’s propaganda apparatus quickly adapted. A follow-up study by the Centre for Democracy and Rule of Law examining Telegram access in Poland uncovered various sanctions-evading techniques. Different language, regional, and thematic versions of the same sanctioned resources remain only partially blocked, while sanctioned channels often operate under modified names to avoid detection.

Telegram’s anonymous publishing service, Telegra.ph, allows users to bypass blocked domains entirely. The platform’s “Forward from” function enables content from blocked channels to be shared with any accessible channel, effectively nullifying restrictions. For Russian-speaking audiences abroad, regional Telegram channels like Sputnik even recommend switching to alternative platforms like Max, where content remains unrestricted.

Regulatory challenges compound the problem. Telegram’s ambiguous user data makes it difficult to classify as a Very Large Online Platform (VLOP) under the EU’s Digital Services Act, exempting it from enhanced regulatory scrutiny and transparency requirements.

The platform’s policy on disinformation further complicates matters. Telegram insists that its verification of reliable sources automatically provides users with accurate information. Critics argue this approach merely facilitates the spread of manipulative content without meaningful restrictions.

“Today, the Kremlin’s main focus is not on resources, but on content,” researchers note. While direct access to Russian propaganda remains blocked for EU citizens, the content itself continues circulating throughout European information spaces.

A growing concern is the emergence of external Russian and pro-Russian networks like Pravda, InfoDefence, and UKRLeaks, which translate and adapt materials from sanctioned Russian sources into EU languages. These resources operate freely and transmit Kremlin narratives to non-Russian speakers.

Russia is also pursuing “access from within” through internal pro-Russian actors in EU countries. These domestic sources prove especially effective since citizens typically place higher trust in local information sources than foreign ones.

Implementation inconsistencies further undermine sanction effectiveness. The accessibility of RT France’s website varies significantly between France and Belgium and even among different internet service providers within those countries, highlighting potential enforcement gaps at both state and provider levels.

Of the 27 Russian propaganda resources currently under EU sanctions, Telegram channels for only 16 are blocked, while channels from nine sanctioned outlets remain freely accessible without technical restrictions.

While Russia’s efforts to adapt demonstrate that sanctions are having an impact, forcing propagandists to find increasingly creative workarounds, experts warn current measures are insufficient. They recommend a comprehensive approach including consistent regulation, enhanced monitoring of information environments, prompt responses to emerging propaganda channels, and improved media literacy among EU populations.

“This is not only a matter of information security,” researchers conclude, “but also of the sustainability of democracy itself in every European country.”