NPP Must Take Action Against Rising Nationalist Propaganda

Sri Lanka’s fragile political landscape faced a troubling development on Friday as nationalist forces gathered in Nugegoda for what organizers called a “national rescue movement.” The rally marked what many observers describe as the reemergence of a familiar coalition of Sinhala-Buddhist hardliners, political figures from previous administrations, and nationalist activists—all united in their opposition to the National People’s Power (NPP) government.

The demonstration carried an unmistakable message: topple the NPP government, which came to power on promises of clean governance, anti-corruption reforms, and breaking the country’s cycle of dynastic politics. Security sources characterized the event as “a warning shot” targeting not only the government but also the social stability the NPP has pledged to maintain.

Among the rally’s prominent voices was Udaya Gammanpila, a well-known Sinhala-Buddhist nationalist figure, who explicitly declared from the stage that the government would be “toppled at the first opportunity.” The event’s organization closely resembled previous nationalist campaigns that undermined the 2015-2019 Yahapalana administration of President Maithripala Sirisena and Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe.

The self-described “Joint Opposition” consists largely of individuals connected to the Rajapaksa political network—a family whose influence has dominated Sri Lankan politics for nearly two decades. Others represent factions led by Wickremesinghe and Sirisena, both facing scrutiny over alleged corruption and misuse of state resources. Religious figures and self-proclaimed “protectors of the nation” rounded out the gathering.

According to Colombo-based diplomatic sources, this coalition appears motivated less by ideological concerns and more by self-preservation. “This is a political alliance of people who have the most to lose from a functioning anti-corruption system,” one senior diplomat noted.

The timing of this nationalist resurgence is not coincidental. The NPP came to power with a strong mandate to establish independent anti-corruption mechanisms capable of investigating past financial crimes, particularly those allegedly involving politically powerful families. Political analysts suggest the Nugegoda rally represents a direct response to the acceleration of several high-profile corruption investigations.

These probes reportedly involve former officials connected to controversial infrastructure projects, questionable foreign bond issuances, defense procurement, and state-owned enterprise deals. Some investigations have allegedly begun tracing funds to offshore accounts and politically linked businesses.

“It is not ideology that unites the Joint Opposition,” a senior political analyst observed. “It is fear—fear of accountability.”

The NPP now faces a dual challenge. First, it must confront a network of experienced nationalist actors skilled at exploiting public grievances in a context where economic recovery remains fragile, living costs remain high, and public patience is wearing thin. Second, it must avoid repeating the Yahapalana government’s mistakes of 2015-2019, when slow implementation, internal divisions, and indecision provided nationalist opponents time to regroup and reframe reform efforts as threats to Sinhala-Buddhist identity.

The rhetoric at Friday’s rally followed a familiar playbook: claims of “threats to Buddhism,” allegations of preferential treatment for minorities, accusations that the NPP is “anti-Sinhala,” and warnings about “foreign influence” and “NGO conspiracies.” These narratives mirror those that undermined previous reform efforts and contributed to Sri Lanka’s economic collapse.

Political historians note that such nationalist movements have consistently resurfaced during periods of political transition in Sri Lanka—from derailing ethnic reconciliation efforts in the 1950s to fueling war rhetoric in the 2000s and legitimizing authoritarianism in the 2010s. Now, the same actors appear to be mobilizing again with similar tactics.

The NPP’s position is particularly precarious. Its voter base—comprising youth, professionals, trade unions, small businesses, and rural voters—supported the party out of desire for clean governance but remains wary of rapid reforms. If the government appears indecisive or slow in delivering promised changes, these voters could become vulnerable to nationalist messaging.

Economists warn that Sri Lanka’s ongoing economic challenges—persistent inflation, incomplete debt relief, unpopular IMF programs, and high rural unemployment—create ideal conditions for nationalist movements to flourish by redirecting public frustration toward manufactured threats.

The lesson from the Yahapalana era is clear: delays in prosecuting corruption and confronting extremist rhetoric provided opponents time to build powerful networks across villages, religious institutions, and media platforms. These networks eventually created an environment conducive to disinformation and political instability.

Even within the NPP’s support base, frustration is growing over the pace of reform. “There is evidence, there are files, there are witnesses,” one civil society leader noted, “but the government is moving as if it has years. It does not.”

For the NPP to succeed where previous reform efforts failed, it must accelerate anti-corruption proceedings, strengthen legal tools against incitement, build coalitions with moderate voices, protect the integrity of security institutions, and communicate clearly with the public.

The Nugegoda rally was a calculated signal that the old political order is organizing its return. Unless the NPP responds decisively, Sri Lanka risks falling back into the hands of the same forces that previously exploited ethno-religious tensions for political gain and contributed to the country’s economic crisis.