China’s Online Influence Operations Exposed by X Platform’s New Identification Tool

X’s Location Feature Exposes China’s Propaganda Machine in Real Time

A simple platform update designed to enhance transparency on X (formerly Twitter) has inadvertently pulled back the curtain on what appears to be an extensive network of Chinese state-backed propaganda accounts operating on the platform.

When X quietly implemented a new feature displaying each account’s IP-based location in mid-November, the Chinese-language internet erupted in chaos. The update, visible under “About this account” on all profiles, reveals where posts originate, whether a user is employing a VPN, and if the account might be concealing its true location.

X product lead Nikita Bier explained the feature was intended to “reduce bots, fake personas, and state-sponsored manipulation” by adding transparency. What unfolded instead was an unprecedented real-time exposure of what many users claim is Beijing’s sophisticated online influence operation.

The revelations were particularly striking because X is officially blocked in mainland China, meaning ordinary citizens must use VPNs that route traffic through other countries to access the platform. Yet as the update rolled out globally, numerous accounts claiming to be “overseas Chinese,” “Taiwanese,” “Japanese,” or “Uyghur activists” suddenly displayed a different reality: “Account based in China.”

Some were flagged for “possible VPN use,” while others showed no such warning—suggesting they were operating through privileged access channels that bypass China’s notorious Great Firewall.

Within hours, users began investigating profiles of well-known nationalistic influencers and state-aligned commentators. The findings quickly became a spectacle across the platform.

Even high-profile figures weren’t spared. Foreign Ministry spokespeople Mao Ning and Lin Jian—two prominent faces of China’s assertive “wolf-warrior diplomacy”—showed IP locations in the United States and Hong Kong, contradicting their purported Beijing base of operations.

Perhaps the most notable revelation involved Hu Xijin, the former Global Times editor renowned for his criticism of Western media and governments. X marked his account location as France, prompting a wave of mockery about whether he was “enjoying a cappuccino on the Seine while warning others not to ‘climb the wall'”—a Chinese idiom for bypassing internet censorship.

The update also exposed networks of accounts suspected of impersonation—profiles presenting themselves as Taiwanese, Japanese, or ethnic minorities while consistently promoting pro-Beijing narratives. Popular accounts like “Xia Yidan,” “Afanti,” and “Zhazhajiang,” which frequently appeared in political discussions attacking democracies and praising Chinese policies, were all revealed to be “based in China.”

Experts believe these accounts operate through special direct-access channels typically reserved for state agencies, major tech companies, or security units. Reports from outside media have previously suggested the existence of “inmate accounts”—troll operations allegedly staffed by prison labor.

As users continued cross-checking accounts, patterns emerged that were difficult to ignore. The same clusters of profiles posted at identical hours, promoted identical slogans, and rarely encountered the firewall restrictions that ordinary Chinese citizens face. Some accounts posted hundreds of times daily in synchronized waves.

Researchers compiled lists of these accounts, documenting their behavior patterns. Many concluded from the evidence that these were not individual voices but components of Beijing’s organized influence architecture—potentially spanning from propaganda units to security services.

The impact was immediate and dramatic. The flood of nationalist posts in Chinese-language threads on X virtually disappeared overnight. Discussions about sensitive topics like Hong Kong, Xinjiang, Taiwan, and democracy movements became noticeably clearer and less disrupted.

Taiwanese users commented that the platform felt “quiet for the first time in years.” Many pro-Beijing accounts either deleted previous posts or went silent altogether. Some attempted to migrate to other platforms like Discord or Telegram, but their reach was significantly diminished.

The situation represents a substantial embarrassment for Beijing, exposing the contradiction between banning citizens from accessing X while simultaneously enabling state-run teams to operate freely and unblocked on the platform.

Elon Musk personally endorsed the update, describing it as part of broader efforts to counter misinformation. While users can still choose to hide their locations, X clearly marks such profiles as “location hidden,” which many now view with increased skepticism.

The transparency update has effectively compromised years of influence-building efforts—spanning COVID-19 disinformation, Taiwan narratives, and aggressive diplomatic messaging. What had previously been a space cluttered with anonymity and coordinated messaging has suddenly become more accessible to authentic voices.

For Beijing, this represents an unexpected vulnerability in its global information strategy, demonstrating how quickly technological transparency can undermine even sophisticated propaganda operations.