Chinese Influence Operations Target Philippine Social Media Through Pro-Duterte Influencers

A congressional hearing last March revealed what many had long suspected: China is actively working to shape Filipino public opinion through social media influencers, particularly those with pro-Duterte leanings. Former Presidential Communications Secretary Trixie Cruz-Angeles confirmed that she and several prominent bloggers—including Mark Lopez, Tio Moreno, Philstar.com columnist Pia Morato, and lawyer Ahmed Paglinawan—participated in a two-week training program in Beijing run by China’s National Radio and Television Administration.

This revelation comes amid ongoing territorial disputes between the Philippines and China over the West Philippine Sea, highlighting Beijing’s sophisticated approach to information operations in the region.

Evidence of these influence operations first emerged in 2020 during former President Rodrigo Duterte’s administration, which notably pivoted toward Beijing. Researchers identified a coordinated disinformation network comprising 155 accounts with 130,000 followers that promoted pro-China politicians, including the Dutertes and Imee Marcos. Facebook subsequently removed these pages, tracing their origin to China.

Since then, Chinese influence campaigns have grown increasingly sophisticated. A recent Reuters investigation uncovered that the Chinese Embassy hired a Manila-based, Chinese-owned firm to promote pro-China messaging using fake accounts and a fake news outlet. Additional research has consistently found that pro-Duterte influencer content tends to favor Chinese narratives.

The evolution of these tactics reflects a learning curve for Chinese information operations. In 2020, when the Chinese embassy produced a pandemic-related music video showcasing Beijing’s assistance to the Philippines, it generated substantial online backlash. This negative reception demonstrated that Filipinos resist overtly pro-China content, leading Beijing to shift toward using Filipino voices as more effective messengers.

Analysts note that determining whether these influencers are acting independently or under contract remains challenging. A 2024 AidData report found that Beijing increasingly “[uses] intermediaries to shape or convey its narratives without direct attribution.” While attendance at state-sponsored programs doesn’t necessarily make someone a foreign asset, these influencers produce content that often confuses the public with misleading analysis.

Experts have identified several “red flags” that signal content functioning as pro-China propaganda, whether intentionally or not:

First, these influencers frequently echo Beijing’s territorial claims to the West Philippine Sea, despite the 2016 international arbitral tribunal ruling that invalidated China’s sweeping “nine-dash line” claim. Tio Moreno, one of the influencers trained in Beijing, posted defenses of the nine-dash line that contradict historical evidence, including China’s own historical maps that placed its southern border only as far as Hainan.

Second, these accounts typically display hypercritical attitudes toward the United States while remaining silent on Chinese aggression. While criticism of American imperialism has legitimate historical roots in the Philippines, pro-China propaganda weaponizes this sentiment by portraying the Philippines as an American “puppet” while ignoring China’s expansionist actions—building artificial islands on Philippine-claimed reefs, ramming Coast Guard vessels, and driving Filipino fishermen from traditional grounds.

Third, they employ contradictory messaging that downplays Chinese threats while simultaneously exaggerating them when convenient. Influencers like Sass Rogando Sasot cherry-pick academic arguments to minimize Chinese aggression, while others like Mark Lopez warn of “nuclear annihilation” should the Philippines stand up to China. This strategy creates a psychological trap: either concerns about Chinese aggression are paranoia, or resisting China will bring disaster.

Fourth, these accounts frequently weaponize accusations of Sinophobia to shut down legitimate criticism of Chinese government actions. By conflating criticism of the Chinese state with prejudice against Chinese people, they attempt to silence debate about China’s territorial aggression.

Finally, pro-China influencers work to undermine confidence in Philippine security institutions by fabricating stories about military instability and attacking the credibility of defense officials. The Armed Forces of the Philippines has repeatedly debunked false claims about internal divisions and coup plots. Officials like Coast Guard spokesman Jay Tarriela, who pioneered the “assertive transparency” approach of documenting Chinese aggression with photos and videos, have become particular targets for character assassination.

While these influence operations haven’t significantly eroded public support for Philippine territorial claims, military historian Jose Custodio warns that China “plays the long game” with disinformation.

“The Philippines, throughout history, has always produced traitors. They are a dime a dozen,” Custodio noted. “We will always be fertile ground for China operations. That’s why we need vigilance.”