Strategies to Counter Global Social Media Manipulation in 2024

In what’s being called a “super-election year,” voters across more than 50 countries will head to the polls amid rising concerns about online information manipulation. The increasing availability of artificial intelligence tools has created new avenues for malicious actors seeking to undermine democratic processes and erode public trust in elections.

Despite these mounting threats, major social media platforms like Facebook, Instagram, YouTube, and X (formerly Twitter) have been scaling back safeguards designed to combat harmful content and disinformation. Even more concerning is the rise of smaller alternative platforms such as Telegram, Mastodon, and Bluesky, which typically have fewer resources dedicated to preserving information integrity during critical election periods.

The decentralization of online communication presents a double-edged sword. While it provides users with diverse platform options, it simultaneously makes election misinformation more difficult to track and prevent. This fragmentation creates blind spots where disinformation can flourish unchecked.

Recent elections worldwide have illustrated these vulnerabilities. During Kenya’s 2022 elections, the Mozilla Foundation documented how TikTok became a conduit for rapidly spreading political disinformation that exploited civilians’ fears of post-electoral violence to intimidate voters and heighten political tensions.

Regional platforms operating outside U.S. jurisdiction, such as Kakao, Line, and Viber, which have substantial user bases in specific countries, often operate under different content moderation standards. Their policies may be developed ad hoc, reflect more permissive community standards, or lack sufficient safeguards against hate speech and disinformation.

The upheaval at X following Elon Musk’s acquisition has created opportunities for alternative platforms. Mastodon and Bluesky have gained traction, while Discord, Clubhouse, Twitch, and Gab have also seen increased usage. However, none have yet achieved the scale of established social media giants, suggesting that the future online landscape will likely remain distributed across various platforms and communities.

In Iran’s 2021 presidential elections, Clubhouse emerged as a forum for electoral debates, with candidates using the app’s “rooms” to discuss their political objectives with thousands of participants. Yet the platform’s privacy policies, which connect accounts to phone numbers and national IDs, raised serious concerns about user safety in a restrictive political environment.

Brazil’s 2022 presidential election saw Telegram become the dominant messaging platform. Researchers at the Brazilian Internet Lab identified disinformation campaigns on the platform calling for military interventions and questioning verified election results. Telegram only addressed these issues after Brazil’s Supreme Electoral Court ordered its blocking, which led to a memorandum of understanding between the company and the government.

While the Brazilian case represents a partial success, it resulted from specific factors unique to that country and is unlikely to provide a repeatable model for global content moderation. The challenge remains: how can stakeholders engage with smaller platforms that often resist participation from civil society, public sector entities, and election management bodies?

Experts suggest several approaches to ensure social media platforms positively impact democratic processes. Civil society organizations, academics, and investors must work together to provide policy and technical oversight while supporting platforms even in countries with limited legal regulations.

One promising strategy involves open-source governance models similar to those used by Wikipedia and Reddit, where communities of moderators help shape platform policies. Academic institutions like Indiana University’s Observatory on Social Media have created dashboards tracking top disinformation spreaders, while open-source human rights impact assessments can measure platforms’ effects on elections.

Multi-stakeholder coalitions can conduct systemic risk assessments and develop crisis protocols for addressing electoral issues. Examples include the Meta Oversight Board, the Christchurch Call to Action, and Article 19’s Social Media Council concept, which provide formal or informal oversight mechanisms.

Human rights-minded investors could play a crucial role by requiring startups to meet certain information integrity criteria, such as transparency around content moderation and privacy protection. After a recent incident involving racial slurs in usernames, Bluesky announced increased investment in its trust and safety team, reportedly following pressure from investors.

Technology can be part of the solution as well. “Democracy bots” could be developed to flag inauthentic political accounts and deepfake content or provide users with information about platform moderation activities. Platforms could incentivize these developments by rewarding developers who create tools aligned with democratic principles.

App stores also wield significant influence. Apple and Google have previously required platforms like Telegram to implement basic content policies. However, using app stores as the sole enforcement mechanism has limitations, potentially leading to disproportionate responses or superficial compliance.

As authoritarian countries build their own digital ecosystems that disregard democratic principles, the need for collaborative efforts among platforms, civil society, investors, and users becomes increasingly urgent. By addressing the unique challenges posed by diverse online platforms and advocating for democratic values, stakeholders can work toward a more inclusive and democratic digital environment during this critical global election year.