China and Russia Wage Cognitive Warfare to Exploit Political Divisions

The use of cognitive tactics in information operations via social media has increasingly overshadowed traditional warfare methods, becoming the dominant tool for both the Kremlin and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to influence public opinion globally.

China’s multifaceted coercion against Taiwan spans military exercises, cyberattacks, and sophisticated social media manipulation, continuously impacting the island’s national security discourse. Recent events like the People’s Liberation Army’s “Joint-Sword 2024-B” military drill near Taiwanese waters—conducted in response to Taiwan’s National Day celebrations—demonstrate Beijing’s persistent pressure campaign.

Despite Taiwan’s broad consensus on confronting Chinese threats, significant internal polarization exists within its political landscape. The divide between the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and the opposition coalition of the Kuomintang and Taiwan People’s Party (KMT/TPP) creates vulnerabilities that China eagerly exploits through information operations and cognitive warfare.

These coercive methods, which weaponize internal divisions through cognitive influence campaigns, form part of a broader “political warfare” strategy. The ultimate objective is to delegitimize Taiwan’s statehood and nationhood, eventually forcing reunification with mainland China—a goal Chinese President Xi Jinping has declared essential for the “great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.”

Similar activities have been observed in the European Union, where Russia stands accused of interfering with EU politics by influencing European Parliament political groups. A recently adopted text by the Parliament notes “increasing attempts by state and non-state actors from third countries to directly or indirectly interfere with democratic decision-making and electoral processes” through hybrid warfare tactics.

Russia’s behavior aligns with President Vladimir Putin’s ambition to restore “Russia’s status as one of the world’s great powers” and “undermine the U.S.-led liberal democratic order”—narratives that fit the definition of political warfare. The Kremlin’s information operations frequently involve cognitive distortion through disinformation on social platforms like X (formerly Twitter) and the deployment of AI and bots to spread pro-Russian narratives.

Research indicates that within the European Parliament, political groups at either extreme of the political spectrum tend to be more tolerant toward Russia and more willing to maintain “business as usual” relations despite the war in Ukraine and energy security concerns. This makes these groups particularly susceptible to cognitive disruption tactics.

Consciousness Manipulation: Taiwan and Transnistria

Both Taiwan and the EU face internal political polarization that creates openings for revisionist powers like Russia and China to exploit through cognitive influence tactics designed to embed discord among their populations. As battlefields increasingly shift online, these cognitive warfare tactics become less perceptible to the average citizen.

A common tactic employed by both Moscow and Beijing is narrative manipulation—termed “consciousness manipulation” by Chinese scholars. This approach involves understanding human psychology to gradually program public opinion, interests, emotions, and even mental status to produce behaviors desired by the manipulators.

Recent case studies demonstrate this approach during crises involving essential goods. In late 2022 and early 2023, Taiwan experienced a severe egg shortage due to global avian influenza, COVID-19 disruptions, and supply chain issues related to the Russia-Ukraine war. While imported eggs provided temporary relief, social anxiety was amplified by pro-China politicians, sympathetic media outlets, and opportunistic manufacturers spreading false rumors.

During this crisis, Chinese government spokesperson Feng-Lian Zhu accused Taiwan’s DPP government of incompetence—a clear cognitive warfare tactic aimed at undermining the administration’s credibility. Former Premier Chien-jen Chen responded by denouncing these disinformation efforts and urging public vigilance.

Similarly, following Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Moldova and its breakaway region Transnistria faced severe energy security challenges. While Moldova pursued pro-EU policies, Transnistria remained effectively a Russian client state, used as a strategic pawn against Moldova’s Western aspirations.

When Russian missile attacks on Ukraine’s infrastructure led to blackouts and skyrocketing energy prices in Moldova in November 2022, residents in Transnistria—heavily influenced by Russian state media and Soviet-era nostalgia—blamed Moldova’s pro-EU government for “technical errors” rather than recognizing Russia’s deliberate restriction of gas supplies.

The responses to these influence operations differed significantly. Taiwan demonstrated remarkable resilience, with its government quickly countering false information. Democratic resilience in Taiwan has strengthened since the pandemic, with research confirming strong social cohesion and a deep sense of Taiwanese identity, particularly among youth.

Taiwanese civil society organizations play crucial roles in combating CCP interference through fact-checking initiatives like the Taiwan FactCheck Center, Cofacts, Doublethink Lab, and others that improve media literacy and provide platforms for dialogue on cognitive warfare.

Conversely, Transnistria lacked both government and civil society mechanisms to counter Russian disinformation. The situation worsened following Russia’s expanded war against Ukraine, with Transnistria’s Russia-born leader Vadim Krasnoselsky amplifying false claims about NATO arming Moldova. Russian propaganda saturates the region through various media channels, resonating particularly with older populations nostalgic for the Soviet era.

These case studies illustrate how China and Russia employ media manipulation and exploit political polarization to undermine public trust in governance. While Taiwan has developed effective whole-of-society defense mechanisms against such tactics, Transnistria’s experience demonstrates the vulnerability of divided societies to cognitive warfare campaigns orchestrated by powerful authoritarian states.