The Digital Battlefield: Protecting Political Campaigns from Disinformation

American political campaigns face unprecedented threats as digital technology enables sophisticated attacks on electoral integrity. From deepfake videos to coordinated disinformation campaigns, these tactics can disrupt democratic discourse and sway voter opinion. However, campaigns can adopt strategic defenses to protect themselves against these emerging threats.

The 2016 U.S. election revealed how easily social media platforms could be manipulated by foreign actors. Russian operatives employed relatively simple tactics: creating divisive content and deploying bot networks and human trolls to disseminate deceptive material to American voters. Once this content gained traction, it was often accepted as fact or reported on by mainstream media, amplifying its impact.

As digital director for Senator Angus King’s 2018 campaign, our team prepared for similar interference. We developed a comprehensive strategy based on what we learned about digital threats and effective countermeasures. While there’s no universal solution, our experience suggests practical steps that campaigns, policymakers, tech companies, and citizens can take to combat disinformation without compromising free expression.

Digital threats take multiple forms. Memes leverage humor or emotion to spread rapidly through social media algorithms. Deepfakes use AI to fabricate events, while traditional video editing tools can alter authentic footage to misrepresent reality. False news pages, often run for political or financial gain, publish divisive content to influence voters and generate ad revenue. Individual accounts spreading false information further complicate the landscape.

The tools used to spread disinformation are equally concerning. Bots—computer scripts running automated social media accounts—can flood platforms with coordinated messages to boost certain topics into trending categories. These accounts typically display unnatural engagement patterns and rarely post personal content. Trolls, meanwhile, are human-operated accounts designed to undermine candidates through falsehoods or topic manipulation. When bots and trolls work in coordination, they can rapidly amplify false narratives across platforms.

As an independent Senate campaign with a $4.3 million budget, we developed cost-effective protection strategies. We assembled a digital team including full-time staff and interns focused specifically on disinformation monitoring, supplemented by approximately $25,000 in consulting services for specialized training.

Our defensive strategy began with protecting campaign infrastructure. We created “honeypot” email accounts containing false information to confuse potential hackers. We recorded all public speaking engagements to maintain authentic records should altered videos appear. We compartmentalized information access within our team to limit potential damage from any breach.

Proactive outreach formed another pillar of our strategy. By developing authentic supporter stories and building relationships with likely voters, we created a network that could recognize imposters and help counter falsehoods.

Our defensive monitoring included daily social media analysis tracking mentions of candidates and divisive issues, evaluating each post’s reach and authenticity. We studied platform algorithms to identify manipulation patterns, like coordinated engagement spikes. We also monitored suspicious Facebook pages, noting that foreign administrators often post political content without directly mentioning candidates.

We established clear protocols for responding to disinformation. Not every false claim warrants a response—sometimes addressing minor falsehoods only amplifies their reach. We developed a response rubric based on two factors: the likelihood the information came from inauthentic sources and its potential impact on voter decisions.

Working directly with social media platforms proved essential. We developed communication channels with platform representatives who shared our interest in preventing manipulation. We flagged suspicious accounts for review, resulting in many being restricted or removed for violating community standards. We also enrolled staff in enhanced security programs that platforms offered to campaigns.

Looking toward future elections, policymakers should designate a government office (likely within DHS) to combat foreign influence operations, fund public education on social media literacy, and clarify data ownership rights. Technology companies must increase transparency by showing country of origin for content, make algorithmic processes more visible to users, strengthen authentication requirements, and close loopholes that allow foreign entities to influence discourse without paying for ads.

The general public bears responsibility too. Social media users should read content critically, understand how algorithms personalize information, and avoid spreading unverified claims. News media must learn to recognize inauthentic behavior and avoid treating social media metrics as reliable indicators of public opinion.

The integrity of our democratic process depends on addressing these digital threats. Through coordinated efforts across multiple sectors, we can preserve the information ecosystem that enables voters to make informed choices on election day.