Russia’s Information Warfare: Lessons from Latvia’s Response Strategy

Russia’s information warfare has transformed Latvia into a testing ground for democratic resilience, with Riga developing a comprehensive national response that offers lessons for other nations facing similar threats.

For more than a decade, Russia has orchestrated information-manipulation campaigns targeting European democracies, with efforts intensifying dramatically since its 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Latvia, particularly vulnerable due to its historical ties and large Russian-speaking minority, has elevated the protection of its information space to a national security priority, formally recognizing it as a defense domain in its National Defense Concept since 2016.

Latvia’s vulnerability has paradoxically positioned it at the forefront of countering such threats. The country now hosts NATO’s Strategic Communications Center of Excellence and collaborates with international organizations like IREX and the Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic Research Lab to investigate disinformation and strengthen media resilience.

Russian influence operations in Latvia follow clear strategic objectives: provoking discord within both Latvian society and the transatlantic community, discrediting Ukraine’s statehood, and undermining trust in Western institutions. These operations have grown increasingly sophisticated, adapting rapidly when Latvia banned dozens of Russian state media outlets following Moscow’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine.

When traditional broadcast channels became unavailable, Kremlin propagandists pivoted to digital platforms. YouTube, TikTok, and Telegram became primary vectors for distributing narratives that portray Latvia’s government as illegitimate, romanticize the Soviet era, and frame NATO and the EU as enemies. Despite Latvia’s countermeasures, approximately 20 percent of the country’s Russian-speaking population still accesses banned Russian state TV through virtual private networks.

Latvia’s defense strategy treats the information domain as seriously as physical defense, implementing a multi-layered approach that spans government, education, civil society, and media. Media literacy training is now embedded in school curricula, while a dedicated strategic communications unit under the State Chancellery coordinates messaging across ministries and works with social media companies to limit the spread of false information.

The government hasn’t hesitated to use regulatory tools, becoming the first Baltic state in 2021 to prosecute individuals for willfully spreading dangerous falsehoods under its Criminal Law. However, few convictions have resulted due to legal ambiguities around the definition of “fake news,” prompting ongoing efforts to refine the legislation.

Beyond government action, Latvia has fostered an ecosystem of non-governmental organizations, academics, and volunteer groups like the “Baltic Elves” who actively track and debunk online falsehoods. Investigative journalists and fact-checkers expose disinformation trends, while initiatives such as the Baltic Centre for Media Excellence work to strengthen professional standards in journalism.

Latvia’s approach, however, is not without limitations. Critics note that the strategy has emphasized blocking malign narratives rather than proactively projecting alternative messaging. The planned discontinuation of funding for Russian-language content on public broadcasting could inadvertently push more Russian-speakers toward Kremlin-controlled information sources.

The country’s experience has contributed significantly to broader transatlantic defense efforts, with Latvia’s advocacy helping NATO to treat disinformation as a core security issue. NATO exercises in the Baltic region now regularly include simulated information-warfare scenarios, and the Alliance has developed counterhybrid support teams that can deploy to allies under attack.

However, concerns are growing about the sustainability of international cooperation. Some U.S. policymakers have characterized efforts to counter foreign disinformation as a “censorship industrial complex,” raising fears of diminished American leadership that could leave European allies more exposed to Russian influence operations.

The European Union has begun to recalibrate its approach, unveiling its ProtectEU strategy in April to strengthen the bloc’s ability to counter hybrid threats. The strategy proposes expanding the powers of EU law enforcement agencies and builds upon the Digital Service Act to regulate large platforms and limit disinformation.

Latvia’s experience demonstrates that even small democracies can effectively strengthen their information environments through a combination of policy tools, public education, media support, and international partnerships. The challenge is maintaining this resilience while balancing security needs with democratic values—particularly freedom of expression—in a threat landscape where adversaries operate without such constraints.

As democracies worldwide confront similar challenges, Latvia’s evolving model offers valuable insights on treating information security as a fundamental component of national defense and societal resilience.