Modern Autocrats Evolve Tactics, Raising Concerns for Democratic Institutions

Some Democrats warn that the United States is sliding toward autocracy, a system where one leader wields unchecked power. Others dismiss such concerns as alarmist, noting that former President Donald Trump hasn’t suspended the Constitution, forced indoctrination of children, or executed rivals—actions associated with notorious dictators like Augusto Pinochet, Mao Zedong, and Saddam Hussein.

However, experts point out that modern autocrats rarely resemble their 20th-century counterparts. Today’s authoritarian leaders often maintain a polished image, avoid overt violence, and appropriate democratic language. They wear business attire, conduct elections, and invoke the will of the people. Rather than terrorizing citizens through brute force, they control media channels and messaging to shape public opinion and advance nationalist narratives. Many secure power through ballot boxes rather than military coups.

Political scientist Andreas Schedler introduced the term “electoral authoritarianism” in the early 2000s to describe regimes that conduct elections without genuine competition. Similarly, scholars Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way coined “competitive authoritarianism” for systems where opposition parties exist but face systemic undermining through censorship, electoral manipulation, or legal restrictions.

In broader research with economist Sergei Guriev, experts have identified a strategy called “informational autocracy” or “spin dictatorship.” These leaders largely avoid violent repression, instead cultivating an image as competent, democratic defenders protecting their nations from external threats or internal enemies supposedly seeking to undermine national culture or wealth.

Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán exemplifies this approach. After returning to power in 2010, Orbán has won three subsequent elections in 2014, 2018, and 2022—campaigns that international observers criticized as “intimidating and xenophobic.” While preserving democratic structures on paper—courts, parliament, and regular elections—he has systematically hollowed them out from within.

During his first two years, Orbán packed Hungary’s constitutional court with loyalists, forced older judges into retirement, and rewrote the constitution to limit judicial review of his actions. He tightened government control over independent media and directed state advertising funds to friendly news outlets. In 2016, an ally purchased Hungary’s largest opposition newspaper only to shut it down shortly after.

Orbán has also targeted civil society organizations and universities. The Central European University, once symbolizing democratic Hungary, was forced to relocate to Vienna in 2020 after legislation penalizing foreign-accredited institutions.

Notably, Orbán largely avoids violence. Journalists face harassment rather than imprisonment or assassination. Critics are discredited for their views but not abducted. His political appeal rests on a narrative that Hungary faces existential threats from immigrants, liberal elites, and foreign influences—with Orbán positioning himself as the sole defender of Hungarian sovereignty and Christian identity.

This pattern of “spin dictatorship” has emerged globally in recent decades, appearing in Singapore, Malaysia, Kazakhstan, Russia, Ecuador, and Venezuela. Leaders like Hugo Chávez and Vladimir Putin (in his earlier years) consolidated power while minimizing overt violence.

Research by Guriev and colleagues confirms this trend, showing a significant drop in political killings and imprisonments by autocrats worldwide from the 1980s through the 2010s. In today’s interconnected global economy, overt repression carries substantial costs. Attacking journalists and dissidents can trigger international sanctions and deter foreign investment. Restricting free expression can stifle innovation—a critical component even authoritarian regimes need in knowledge-based economies.

However, during crises, even these “spin dictators” often revert to traditional tactics. Russia’s Putin has violently suppressed protesters and imprisoned opposition leaders. Meanwhile, more brutal regimes like North Korea and China continue ruling through fear, combining mass incarceration with advanced surveillance technologies.

Most experts agree the United States remains a democracy, though some of Trump’s tactics resemble those of informational autocrats. He has attacked the press, defied court rulings, and pressured universities. His expressed admiration for strongmen like Putin, China’s Xi Jinping, and El Salvador’s Nayib Bukele has raised concerns among observers.

The United States benefits from robust institutions—newspapers, universities, courts, and advocacy groups—that serve as checks on government power. These institutions help explain why populists like Italy’s Silvio Berlusconi or Israel’s Benjamin Netanyahu, despite challenging democratic norms, have not dismantled democracy in their countries.

America’s constitutional structure provides additional protection, requiring a two-thirds majority in both congressional chambers and ratification by three-quarters of states for amendments—far more difficult than in Hungary, where Orbán needed only a parliamentary supermajority to rewrite the constitution.

While American democracy is not immune to erosion, its institutional foundations are older, deeper, and more decentralized than many newer democracies. The federal structure, with overlapping jurisdictions and multiple veto points, complicates any single leader’s ability to dominate the system completely.

Nevertheless, the global rise of spin dictatorships should heighten awareness of democratic vulnerabilities in the United States. As autocrats worldwide have learned to control populations by mimicking democracy, understanding their techniques may prove essential for preserving authentic democratic governance.