Measuring Resilience Against Foreign Disinformation Campaigns

In an era of growing digital connectivity, countries worldwide have seen a troubling rise in false and misleading information targeting political events and actors. Yet the impact of these disinformation campaigns varies significantly across nations. Some countries prove remarkably vulnerable, while others demonstrate substantial resilience against such manipulation attempts.

This disparity raises important questions for policymakers and researchers. Why did foreign actors successfully spread disinformation during the 2016 US presidential elections but fail to significantly influence Sweden’s 2018 parliamentary elections? Understanding what makes societies resistant to foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI) has become a critical security concern.

The problem extends beyond simple misinformation. An increasing number of citizens are becoming actively misinformed – holding factually incorrect beliefs based on deliberately deceptive content. This phenomenon is particularly dangerous when propagated by foreign actors seeking to destabilize societies for geopolitical advantage.

Recent examples illustrate the challenge. Pro-Russian content has flooded African media outlets, legitimizing Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and advancing Russian interests across the continent. The Covid-19 pandemic and the Ukraine war have demonstrated how quickly disinformation can spread through social media platforms, often with significant real-world consequences.

While many efforts have focused on reactive measures like fact-checking and platform regulations, attention is increasingly turning toward proactive solutions that strengthen societal resilience – the ability of communities to maintain their well-being while withstanding external challenges.

A comprehensive approach to measuring FIMI resilience requires examining three distinct dimensions: societal cohesion and state legitimacy at the macro level; the political information environment at the meso level; and individual resilience to disinformation at the micro level.

Societal divisions provide fertile ground for disinformation to take root. Research shows that in polarized environments, individuals struggle to distinguish between accurate and false information. Malign actors exploit existing grievances, targeting societies where opposing groups already experience tension or conflict. In such contexts, false narratives that reinforce existing biases spread more readily.

The political information environment also plays a crucial role. This includes news media, social media, and various “curating actors” like journalists and political elites who shape public discourse. Countries with fragmented media landscapes, high social media usage, and partisan information ecosystems typically prove more vulnerable to disinformation.

Political factors significantly influence resilience. Disinformation thrives alongside populist or anti-pluralist rhetoric that exploits emotions rather than evidence. Societies with strong populist movements often demonstrate greater susceptibility to false narratives. Similarly, distrust in traditional authorities—government, journalists, experts—increases reliance on alternative and sometimes untrustworthy information sources.

Even when societal and media environments are compromised, individual resilience serves as the final defense. Educational attainment, media literacy, and psychological well-being all influence a person’s ability to identify and reject false information. Those with strong critical thinking skills and digital literacy are better equipped to navigate complex information landscapes.

The African continent has become a particular battleground for competing information campaigns. Non-democratic regimes including Russia and China are leveraging information warfare to influence public discourse, often building on pre-existing anticolonial sentiments. Recent anti-French protests supporting military coups in Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso—with demonstrators expressing support for Russia—highlight the real-world implications of these influence operations.

Analysis reveals stark contrasts in resilience across West African nations. Countries like Senegal and The Gambia demonstrate higher resilience scores, while more fragile and conflict-affected states like Nigeria and Mali show greater vulnerability. These differences correlate with the frequency of disinformation campaigns targeting these nations.

Nigeria, with the region’s lowest resilience score, faces significant challenges. Its ethnic diversity and persistent ethno-religious conflicts create multiple grievances for foreign actors to exploit. A fractured political discourse, widespread distrust in institutions, and lower information literacy—particularly in rural and conflict-affected areas—further compromise its defenses against disinformation.

The Gambia, by contrast, has shown marked improvement in resilience following its democratic transition. Greater social cohesion, expanding democratic debate, and increasing freedom of expression have strengthened its position against foreign manipulation.

This systematic assessment of resilience enables more targeted and effective responses to disinformation. By identifying specific vulnerabilities within countries or regions, policymakers can direct resources toward strengthening the most critical weak points in their information ecosystems.

As FIMI threats continue to evolve, building proactive resilience becomes increasingly vital. Understanding the interplay between social cohesion, information environments, and individual capabilities provides a framework for developing effective countermeasures. This approach can help preserve democratic values, protect public discourse, and maintain stability in an increasingly contested information landscape.