Chinese Military’s Covert Social Media Tactics Against Taiwan Revealed

In a concerning development for cross-strait relations, evidence has emerged detailing China’s systematic planning and execution of social media manipulation campaigns targeting Taiwan’s democratic processes.

While much attention has focused on the visible effects of Chinese disinformation in Taiwan since the 2018 local elections, researchers have identified a critical gap in understanding: how the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) developed its interest in social media manipulation, specifically prepared operations against Taiwan, and evolved its tactics over time.

Documents from the People’s Liberation Army Strategic Support Force (PLASSF) Base 311, China’s primary unit for psychological warfare against Taiwan, reveal a decade-long strategy to infiltrate and manipulate Taiwan’s online information environment. This unit, formerly part of the General Political Department and now under the Strategic Support Force created during Xi Jinping’s military reorganization, has meticulously studied Taiwanese social media habits and developed increasingly sophisticated methods to influence public opinion.

According to researchers Nathan Beauchamp-Mustafaga from RAND Corporation and Jessica Drun from the Project 2049 Institute, Chinese military writings demonstrate a clear progression from observation to active interference.

“Unlike previous analyses that focus only on the outputs of Chinese disinformation, examining the PLA’s own writings gives us crucial insight into their strategic thinking and technical preparation,” Beauchamp-Mustafaga explained.

As early as 2011, an editor from Huayi Broadcasting Company—identified as a commercial front for Base 311—published detailed analysis of Taiwan’s social media landscape, recognizing its growing importance for political mobilization. The article recommended expanding Chinese platforms into Taiwan, establishing guided social media discussions, leveraging opinion leaders, and embracing multiple media formats to shape Taiwanese public opinion.

The 2014 Sunflower Movement and Ko Wen-je’s successful social media-driven mayoral campaign in Taipei prompted increased attention from Base 311. Chinese analysts viewed these developments with alarm, noting that social media was weakening Taiwan’s traditional two-party system and spreading anti-China sentiment.

Following Tsai Ing-wen’s 2016 election victory, Base 311 writings show a significant shift in tone and tactics. A May 2016 article explicitly called for “strengthening awareness of online public opinion intervention” and expanding “the cultivation and use of online opinion leaders” to guide Taiwanese public opinion in directions favorable to Beijing.

By October 2018, shortly before Taiwan’s local elections, Base 311 researchers were openly discussing equipment requirements for “cognitive domain operations” on platforms like Facebook, Twitter, and LINE. They advocated developing technology for real-time content distribution, voice synthesis using deep learning, sentiment analysis through big data, and even leveraging willing or unwitting Taiwanese actors to maintain secrecy.

Taiwan’s National Security Bureau has identified the PLASSF as the main organization behind social media disinformation during the 2018 election cycle, suggesting its personnel numbered around 300,000. However, unlike U.S. intelligence assessments of Russian interference in the 2016 presidential election, Taiwan has not released comprehensive declassified reports on Chinese operations.

Security experts warn that Beijing’s approach has grown more sophisticated, potentially using artificial intelligence to control how manipulated content is injected into online platforms. The PLA’s techniques include creating culturally authentic content that blends in with local communication styles, using Southern Min language patterns to avoid detection, and distributing disinformation through trusted small-scale Taiwanese media outlets.

This revelation highlights the need for greater focus on the stated intentions and tactical considerations of entities within the PLA charged with carrying out social media interference. Understanding the adversary’s thinking and preparation provides a more solid foundation for developing effective countermeasures to protect Taiwan’s democratic processes from foreign interference.

As cross-strait tensions continue to rise, these findings underscore how social media has become the latest battleground in China’s long-running campaign to influence Taiwanese public opinion and undermine the island’s democracy.