Sectarianism, Social Media, and Syria’s Information Crisis After Assad

Syria’s first state-sponsored television news channel since Bashar al-Assad’s fall from power launched on May 5th with a panel discussion featuring the governor of Suwayda and two prominent Druze leaders addressing the region’s security crisis. The debut of al-Ikhbariya represents a small but significant step toward rebuilding communication channels across a fragmented country, though substantial challenges remain.

Since Assad’s December ousting, Syrians have struggled to distinguish truth from falsehood regarding security incidents and government decisions. Under Assad’s regime, all media were state-controlled and heavily censored, leading most Syrians to rely on Facebook for local news that bypassed censorship. In the power vacuum following the regime’s collapse, social media has become even more central to Syrians’ information ecosystem—with predictably problematic results.

“The biggest problem is Facebook,” one woman in Latakia bluntly told researchers.

The information void has been particularly consequential in Syria’s Alawite-majority coastal regions, where Assad’s ethno-religious group has traditionally held power. Since December, these communities have depended on social media both to raise awareness of sectarian crimes and to seek information about their safety. This ecosystem quickly became saturated with false claims of massacres and international intervention, creating panic even before the March 6 insurgent uprising that resulted in the deaths of over 1,600 security personnel and civilians from both Sunni and Alawite communities.

Recent investigations by the BBC, Arabi Post, Verify-Sy, and the German Marshall Fund have highlighted how foreign actors, including Iran, Israel, and Hezbollah, have exploited this information vacuum by launching sophisticated disinformation campaigns that promote sectarian narratives online. One particularly damaging rumor claimed that Maher al-Assad, the former president’s brother, was returning to the coast with Russian military support to reclaim Syria.

“That night you could hear gunfire from every village here, they all believed he was returning and celebrated,” recalled a Christian businessman from Safita, pointing to surrounding Alawite communities.

Without access to reliable news sources, different sectarian communities have developed entirely separate narratives about major security events. Interfaith dialogues frequently collapse into disputes over basic facts, further entrenching divisions. For many Alawites, unverified claims of violence have been interpreted collectively as evidence of “genocide” against their community since Assad’s fall. Meanwhile, when false claims are disproven, many Sunnis use this to dismiss even legitimate reports of sectarian violence.

The new Syrian government has attempted to establish official communication channels, including Facebook pages for Tartous and Latakia governorates, but these efforts have reached relatively few people and failed to counter the influence of higher-traffic private pages. When asked where they get official government news, most Syrians interviewed made no mention of these pages, instead relying on word-of-mouth and personal online networks.

“Who represents the government?” asked one Christian resident of Safita, highlighting the confusion.

Local officials in Latakia and Tartous have created WhatsApp groups to connect communities directly with security and administrative officials. While these groups have proved useful for reporting crime and disseminating information, their effectiveness is limited by size constraints and accessibility issues. As one female activist in Tartous noted, the groups were predominantly male and capped at 400 participants, forcing those excluded to rely on secondhand information.

The confusion extends to fundamental government policies, including the settlement process for former regime soldiers, civil society regulations, curfews, and checkpoint operations. “There is confusion about who is going to be detained or killed,” explained a priest in Suqlabiyah, noting that locals frequently approach him with questions about what constitutes a war crime.

Addressing this information crisis requires multiple approaches. First, researchers recommend that the March 6 Investigation Committee release an accurate, uncensored report on the coastal violence to help bridge the trust gap between Sunni and Alawite narratives. Second, expanding civil communication networks through local councils and journalists could foster more accurate local news systems, though this requires international funding and clear authorization from Damascus to avoid legal complications.

Third, government media channels must expand to include local security announcements and address rumors of violations committed by security forces. Finally, international organizations should increase funding for local media outlets, particularly those engaged in professional fact-checking, to build institutions with credibility beyond Facebook’s platform.

As Syria navigates its post-Assad reality, rebuilding trustworthy information channels will be essential not only for effective governance but also for healing the deep sectarian divisions that threaten the country’s stability and reconciliation efforts.