UK Needs National Disinformation Agency to Combat False Information

In a significant shift in national security priorities, the UK government’s 2025 Strategic Defence Review has identified disinformation as a top-tier threat requiring an urgent institutional response comparable to the country’s approach to cybersecurity a decade ago.

The review highlights how the UK successfully consolidated its cybersecurity efforts in 2015 by establishing the National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC), which brought previously fragmented capabilities under one authoritative body. Today, experts argue a similar unified approach is critically needed to counter sophisticated disinformation campaigns that form a core component of state-sponsored hybrid warfare.

Intelligence assessments reveal Russia and China have deeply embedded information warfare into their national security strategies, viewing the cognitive domain as a primary battlefield rather than a secondary consideration. For these nations, subversion represents the main event, not a side operation.

OpenAI’s June 2025 threat intelligence report provided concrete evidence of this strategic focus, documenting how state actors primarily misuse AI platforms to support information operations rather than conventional cyber attacks. The report details operations from China, Russia, and Iran that generate social media content and fake personas at an unprecedented scale. In one instance, a single Chinese operation produced hundreds of coordinated comments across various platforms, while Russian operatives deployed AI tools to interfere in German elections through the sophisticated “Portal Kombat” network.

Modern disinformation campaigns have evolved beyond crude fake news. Today’s operations succeed primarily through the manipulation of authentic information, carefully selecting real content and amplifying it to distort public perception. These operations leverage algorithmic systems to create false impressions of public sentiment, operating at a scale that exceeds what traditional media regulation or intelligence agencies can effectively address.

The financial investment behind these operations is substantial. Russia has reportedly allocated over $1 billion to ongoing disinformation campaigns aimed specifically at undermining Western support for Ukraine.

Despite recognizing this threat, the UK’s response remains fragmented across various government departments, civil society organizations, and private sector entities. The Cabinet Office’s recent Chronic Risks Analysis identified information warfare as a systemic threat to national stability, yet the institutional architecture to address it remains disjointed.

The consequences of this fragmentation became painfully apparent during the 2024 Southport attacks and subsequent Summer Race Riots. Foreign interference significantly amplified false information following the tragic killing of three young girls, sparking nationwide riots within hours. Regulatory bodies found themselves unable to enforce effective countermeasures in real-time.

The current structure sees platform regulation, public messaging, and threat actor tracking distributed across different departments, agencies, and military units. No single entity possesses the mandate, resources, or authority to coordinate a comprehensive response when information operations unfold.

The speed mismatch represents another critical vulnerability. Information warfare operates at digital speed, with adversaries adapting tactics and exploiting events within hours. Government response timeframes—typically measured in weeks or months—are fundamentally misaligned with the operational tempo of modern information campaigns.

Even recent regulatory advances such as the Online Safety Act, while representing progress, still rely primarily on reactive content takedown mechanisms that cannot match the speed at which adversaries manipulate legitimate information or pivot their strategic objectives.

Security analysts suggest that establishing a dedicated national center for countering disinformation—with clear authority, rapid response capabilities, and cross-sector coordination powers—could provide the institutional framework needed to address this evolving threat landscape effectively.

As the UK approaches its next comprehensive security review, the pressing question remains whether policymakers will recognize that countering disinformation requires the same whole-of-society institutional response that cybersecurity received a decade ago, before the next information-driven crisis emerges.