The Growing Threat of Professional Disinformation Services

The rise of a global disinformation industry has fundamentally transformed how propaganda operates in the modern world, with far-reaching implications for democratic societies. What was once the exclusive domain of authoritarian states and intelligence agencies has evolved into a privatized marketplace where deception is available to the highest bidder.

Over the past decade, a quiet but profound shift has occurred as information operations have been increasingly outsourced to private companies specializing in disinformation and Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI). These firms, often staffed by individuals with backgrounds in intelligence, military operations, or marketing, now offer comprehensive packages that include fake social media campaigns, hacking services, strategic data leaks, and sophisticated “narrative management.”

This commercialization represents a significant departure from traditional state-run propaganda operations. While countries like the Soviet Union pioneered dezinformatsiya tactics and Russia later modernized these approaches through entities like the Internet Research Agency (IRA), today’s landscape features a global network of private contractors operating in a murky realm between legitimate business and covert influence operations.

The strategic advantages of outsourcing disinformation are clear. For authoritarian regimes, these arrangements provide both increased operational efficiency and—perhaps more crucially—plausible deniability. By maintaining arm’s-length relationships with private operators, states can influence foreign public opinion while shielding themselves from diplomatic consequences or international sanctions.

This approach enables what experts call “information laundering”—a process where the true origin of disinformation is obscured as content passes through layers of private firms, manufactured accounts, and proxy media outlets. As messages are amplified across these networks, they begin to appear organic and locally produced rather than foreign-directed influence operations.

The 2023 investigation by Forbidden Stories into an entity known as “Team Jorge” provided a rare glimpse into this shadow industry. The organization reportedly boasted of interference in 33 presidential elections globally, claiming victory in 27 cases. Their clients allegedly included political parties, corporations, and state-linked actors seeking covert influence capabilities.

Team Jorge’s technological arsenal centered around Advanced Impact Media Solutions (AIMS), a sophisticated platform capable of creating and coordinating thousands of synthetic social media accounts complete with AI-generated photos, fictional biographies, and manufactured personal histories. These digital avatars could be deployed en masse to shape online conversations, amplify specific narratives, or target opponents.

Russia continues to play a significant role in this ecosystem through privately-owned companies like the Social Design Agency and Structura. These firms effectively provide the Kremlin with modern alternatives to traditional troll factories, managing networks of covert online assets while maintaining a layer of separation from the Russian state.

Modern influence operations have evolved beyond purely digital tactics to incorporate hybrid approaches that bridge online and offline environments. The IRA demonstrated this capability during the 2016 US presidential election by organizing real-world rallies through fake American activist personas, paying participants, and coordinating online amplification around these physical events.

Today’s campaigns frequently combine traditional techniques with technological innovations. Operators establish credible-seeming news sites and influencer personas to inject tailored narratives into mainstream discourse. Once in circulation, these narratives blend with legitimate content and spread across both digital and traditional media channels, making manipulation increasingly difficult to detect.

The human-intensive model of disinformation—featuring hundreds of workers manually creating content in shifts—is rapidly giving way to AI-driven automation. Systems powered by large language models can now manage thousands of fake accounts and generate multilingual content tailored to specific audiences in real time. This technological leap allows operations that once required substantial manpower to be executed by small teams or even individuals.

This evolution has created a dangerous asymmetry in information warfare. Autocracies enjoy maximum reach with minimal risk, protected at home by censorship and control while denying involvement abroad. Democracies, conversely, face maximum vulnerability with limited defenses due to their commitment to transparency, free expression, and legal constraints.

The implications for democratic societies are profound. Influence-for-hire firms have already targeted elections across Africa, Europe, and Latin America. Their campaigns amplify existing polarization, undermine trust in media institutions, and exploit social divisions to weaken democratic cohesion.

As these capabilities become more accessible and sophisticated, particularly with advances in artificial intelligence, the challenge of preserving factual discourse and electoral integrity will only grow more complex. Responding effectively requires not just technological solutions but a deeper recognition of how the commercialization of disinformation has fundamentally altered the information landscape.