Takaichi Receives Mandate to Address Hybrid Threats; Australia Provides Potential Model

In a significant development for Japan’s national security, Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi is leveraging her strong public mandate to enhance the nation’s defenses against hybrid threats. With approval ratings between 71 and 82 percent, Japan’s first female prime minister has a unique opportunity to strengthen the country’s approach to information warfare, election interference, and covert foreign influence.

Takaichi, whose leadership style has been influenced by former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and Britain’s Margaret Thatcher, brings a reputation for patriotic positions and decisive leadership to the role. Her government is now looking to build upon initiatives started under her predecessor, Shigeru Ishiba, who began centralizing Japan’s response to hybrid threats through the Cabinet Secretariat.

The system established in September tasks the deputy chief cabinet secretary with coordinating how various ministries detect, analyze, and respond to disinformation and election interference. This structure bears similarities to Australia’s model, which combines the Electoral Integrity Assurance Taskforce with the National Counter Foreign Interference Coordinator and Counter Foreign Interference Coordination Centre.

Japan faces growing challenges from disinformation, particularly during elections. The Japan Fact-Checking Center has documented misleading and fabricated content during recent electoral campaigns, including the 2024 Hyogo governor and 2025 Upper House elections. Compounding this issue is declining public trust in traditional media across all age groups, making social media increasingly influential in shaping political opinions and voting decisions.

In an August interview with Nikkei, Takaichi highlighted a critical vulnerability in Japan’s security framework: the absence of comprehensive legislation prohibiting foreign espionage activities. She has called for new laws that clearly define espionage, establish investigative procedures, and create mechanisms for international cooperation. The prime minister is also advocating for a national intelligence bureau to serve as a central hub for intelligence collection and analysis.

Takaichi’s security vision extends to creating a dedicated signals intelligence agency with legal authority to intercept communications—capabilities she argues are essential for detecting foreign attempts to manipulate public opinion, influence elections, sow division, or damage Japan’s international relationships.

Regional developments underscore the urgency of these efforts. China’s multi-faceted interference in Taiwan has demonstrated how hybrid threats can escalate tensions, with direct implications for Japanese security. Events in Taiwan and on the Korean Peninsula are intimately connected to Japan’s domestic security environment, highlighting the need for robust detection and response capabilities.

Australia’s experience offers valuable lessons for Japan in developing a coordinated system to counter hybrid threats. The Australian model centers on the National Intelligence Community—a network of agencies that share data, threat assessments, and operational planning to protect national interests. Key components include the Australian Federal Police, Australian Signals Directorate (ASD), Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO), and the Office of National Intelligence.

Australian security agencies have prioritized transparency, with both ASIO’s director general and ASD’s former director general issuing public warnings about foreign interference. While Japan’s cabinet website does provide information on foreign disinformation, adopting more of Australia’s transparency measures could help build greater public awareness and social resilience.

Australia has also equipped its agencies with modern legal tools through legislation like the 2018 Espionage and Foreign Interference Act, which established comprehensive offenses for covert foreign interference. This legal framework gives Australian agencies clear authority to disrupt, deter, and prosecute malign activities—authority that Japanese agencies currently lack.

Not all Australian initiatives have been equally successful. The 2018 Foreign Influence Transparency Scheme, which requires registration by those representing foreign interests, has faced criticism for being unfocused. Similarly, a review of the Foreign Arrangements Scheme recommended more targeted application and reduced bureaucracy.

The intensifying geostrategic competition in the Indo-Pacific region, combined with Takaichi’s strong public support, creates a window of opportunity for Japan to reshape its security posture and intelligence architecture. By incorporating lessons from Australia’s experience, Takaichi could strengthen Japan’s resilience against hybrid threats, address legal and institutional gaps, and build a more coordinated national response to foreign interference.

Success in these efforts would not only enhance Japan’s domestic security but also deepen Australia-Japan security cooperation and reinforce Tokyo’s role as a key player in addressing regional security challenges that affect all Indo-Pacific democracies.