Russian ‘New Cold War’ Employs Disinformation and Hybrid Tactics, Polish Researcher Warns

Poland’s information security is directly tied to the stability of its eastern neighbors, according to Wojciech Kotowicz, a senior academic at the University of Warmia and Mazury (UWM) in Olsztyn. He warns that Russia treats information as a “weapon with strategic range” in its modern military doctrine.

“If we allow disinformation to triumph in Moldova, Poland will become the next, direct target of even more aggressive information campaigns,” Kotowicz cautioned in a recent interview.

His statements come following a comprehensive research project conducted last year by UWM’s Institute of Political Science. The study examined “the impact of Russian disinformation on shaping public opinion in Eastern European countries,” with a particular focus on Moldova and Georgia, while also developing counter-strategies against such campaigns.

The findings suggest that a new form of cold war is underway – one that unfolds “not only in the air, but also in our minds and online,” according to Kotowicz. This represents a fundamental shift from the geopolitical conflicts of the 20th century, as today’s rivalry “takes place primarily in the information and cognitive space.”

Perhaps most concerning is Russia’s ability to pursue strategic objectives without conventional military assets. “Russia doesn’t need tanks or aircraft. A smartphone, a social media account, and a well-constructed narrative are enough,” Kotowicz explained.

During field research in Moldova and Georgia in 2025, the UWM team witnessed disinformation campaigns that dramatically shifted political views within entire communities in just months. Kotowicz described a particularly striking pattern: “Older people who for years supported European integration suddenly began to believe that the European Union supposedly wants to destroy their traditional values and take their land.”

These campaigns operated systematically through multiple channels, including social media, Russian-language television, and networks of seemingly independent commentators who were actually “financed from Moscow.” This coordinated approach allowed disinformation to penetrate deeply into local communities.

The strategic objective behind what Kotowicz calls the “war in our minds” targets the foundations of democratic societies: public perception, beliefs, and trust in institutions. “Russia does not have to physically conquer Eastern European countries if it can make their citizens themselves turn away from the West and democracy,” he noted.

Moldova’s recent referendum on European integration offers a compelling case study. While pro-European forces ultimately secured a victory, Kotowicz characterized it as a narrow result achieved despite “unprecedented” disinformation and vote-buying efforts. Experts consulted during the research believed support would have been significantly higher without Russian interference.

The research team anticipates that Russia’s disinformation tactics will continue to evolve, incorporating more advanced technologies and adapting quickly to defensive measures. Social media platforms remain particularly vulnerable battlegrounds, as their engagement-driven algorithms often amplify controversial and emotionally charged content over reliable information.

Looking forward, Kotowicz highlighted emerging patterns in Russian disinformation strategies. In 2026, researchers observed a new wave of narratives related to Europe’s energy crisis, with coordinated social media campaigns claiming that sanctions hurt Europe more than Russia and that European leaders were deliberately impoverishing their populations.

The viral potential of such narratives poses an ongoing challenge for European security. These claims can reach millions of users rapidly, potentially undermining public support for policies that protect European interests and security.

As Eastern Europe continues to navigate these complex information challenges, the research underscores the interconnected nature of regional security. For Poland, maintaining robust defenses against disinformation may increasingly depend on supporting similar resilience in neighboring states like Moldova and Georgia.

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