Russian Disinformation Campaigns Blur Line Between Peace and War, Study Finds

Russian disinformation operations are strategically designed to undermine societies by eroding public trust in democratic institutions, according to new research from the University of Warmia and Mazury in Olsztyn, Poland.

The study, led by Wojciech Kotowicz from the university’s Institute of Political Sciences, reveals that the boundary between peace and war in the information sphere has effectively disappeared, with disinformation becoming an integral component of broader hybrid warfare strategies.

“During our study visits to Chisinau and Tbilisi, experts confirmed that information is used to destabilize sentiment before key votes,” Kotowicz explained. “It is also used to mask real military actions or exert psychological pressure on civilians. We see that in the information sphere, the line between peacetime and wartime has practically ceased to exist.”

The research team examined the impact of Russian disinformation on public opinion across Eastern European countries, focusing particularly on Moldova and Georgia. Their findings indicate that contemporary Russian doctrine employs information operations in conjunction with economic pressure, military threats, and cyberattacks to influence political processes and paralyze decision-making in target countries.

The controversial “foreign agents” law in Georgia provides a compelling case study. According to Kotowicz, Russian media and pro-Russian Georgian politicians conducted an intensive information campaign portraying the law as necessary for protecting sovereignty against alleged Western imperialism. They skillfully blended factual examples of Western involvement with fiction to create persuasive narratives.

Simultaneously, the same disinformation networks systematically discredited mass protests against the law, utilizing deepfakes and fabricated evidence to characterize demonstrators as paid Western agents. Social media campaigns attempted to intimidate potential protesters by spreading false reports of arrests and government repression.

These information tactics didn’t operate in isolation. Russia also threatened energy restrictions and trade sanctions against Georgian products while coordinating cyberattacks targeting government institutions and independent media outlets. These digital assaults were subsequently leveraged in disinformation campaigns as supposed evidence of the instability and weakness of pro-European policies.

“This multifaceted, coordinated attack demonstrates how information has become an integral part of a broader hybrid strategy,” Kotowicz noted.

A key finding from the research is that local political actors and influencers frequently serve as crucial vectors for spreading pro-Kremlin narratives, often unwittingly. The researchers discovered that public resistance to these manipulations is particularly low in regions with limited access to independent media sources.

“This conclusion indicates that simple fact-checking is not enough; a profound reform of media education and the strengthening of civil society are necessary,” Kotowicz emphasized.

The sophistication of Russian disinformation has evolved significantly in recent years. “The days when Russian propaganda was easily recognizable due to its primitiveness and obvious bias are over,” Kotowicz said. “Modern disinformation campaigns utilize advanced data analytics, artificial intelligence, and a deep understanding of local cultural and social contexts.”

In Moldova, researchers observed Russian campaigns employing different narratives carefully tailored to specific ethnic and linguistic groups. Meanwhile, in Georgia, campaigns relied heavily on local influencers and opinion leaders who frequently didn’t realize they were amplifying pro-Kremlin messaging.

Perhaps most concerning is the research team’s conclusion that these disinformation efforts represent components of a long-term strategic initiative rather than isolated campaigns. They found evidence in both Moldova and Georgia of systematic efforts to build pro-Russian influence networks, fund local media organizations, and support specific politicians and political parties.

“Disinformation is just one element of this broader strategy, which also encompasses economic, political, and social influence,” Kotowicz said. “This means that effective countermeasures must also be long-term, strategic, and multidimensional.”

The findings come at a critical time when concerns about foreign information manipulation are heightened across Europe, particularly in countries with historical ties to Russia. The research underscores the need for comprehensive approaches to counter such threats, extending beyond reactive measures to include proactive strengthening of democratic institutions and media literacy.