Disinformation Concerns Rise as TikTok’s Influence Poses Challenges to European Security

Foreign actors are increasingly using TikTok to influence European elections through coordinated disinformation campaigns, as evidenced by recent electoral interference across the continent.

In December 2024, European authorities uncovered a coordinated TikTok campaign by foreign actors supporting pro-Russian candidate Calin Georgescu during Romania’s presidential election. The severity of the interference prompted the European Commission to launch formal proceedings against TikTok, while Romania’s courts annulled the first round of voting. Though the election was postponed until spring 2025 and eventually won by moderate candidate Nicusor Dan, the incident highlighted how Russian-backed entities can manipulate social media algorithms to advance populist candidates.

This pattern of interference extends beyond Eastern Europe. During Germany’s February 2025 federal election, fact-checking organizations documented at least 200 instances of false political statements circulating on TikTok. In Poland’s recent presidential election, which saw right-wing candidate Karol Nawrocki emerge victorious, evidence showed the platform’s algorithm heavily favored right-wing content over other political viewpoints.

A recent German study revealed that TikTok users in Germany are particularly susceptible to Russian and Chinese disinformation, displaying a greater tendency to believe anti-Western narratives that align with populist messaging. Germany’s far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) maintains the strongest political presence on TikTok, with the populist Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance (BSW) gaining momentum. With approximately 70% of Germans aged 16-29 using TikTok, this demographic faces significant exposure to manipulated content designed to advance populist agendas.

For the foreign actors orchestrating these campaigns, capturing young audiences represents just the initial phase of a broader strategy. Their ultimate goal is to polarize societies, undermine democratic institutions, and bolster political figures sympathetic to their interests.

Russia and China employ distinct approaches to social media manipulation. Russian strategy incorporates hybrid warfare techniques as part of its broader geopolitical toolkit. While Poland has accused Russia of physical attacks like arson in Warsaw, Moscow also employs subtler “peacetime techniques” aimed at steering Western decisions toward Russian interests and weakening democratic structures.

China presents different security concerns through ByteDance, TikTok’s parent company. The platform’s private messages lack end-to-end encryption, creating vulnerabilities even in vetted app installations. Since Chinese companies like ByteDance operate under the influence of the Chinese Communist Party and must provide user data to Chinese authorities upon request, the platform potentially offers Beijing access to extensive information on European and American citizens, including sensitive location data that could provide strategic advantages.

The EU has established regulatory frameworks to address these threats. Ireland’s Data Protection Commission recently fined TikTok €530 million for illegally transferring European user data to China. Additionally, the European Commission has initiated proceedings against TikTok under the Digital Services Act (DSA) regarding electoral risks, though investigations continue. However, the urgent nature of these threats demands more stringent measures and faster implementation, as enforcement mechanisms still lag behind the rapid spread of disinformation.

To create a safer digital environment, European governments should implement a four-step strategy focusing on curbing disinformation and mitigating the impact of TikTok’s Chinese affiliations.

First, EU member states should institute a comprehensive ban on TikTok and other ByteDance applications on official devices used by government authorities. While many countries have already implemented such restrictions, enforcement remains inconsistent across Europe. Public sector employees should also receive training in media literacy and cybersecurity to strengthen resilience against foreign influence.

Second, the EU must apply stronger legal pressure on ByteDance through existing regulatory tools like the DSA and General Data Protection Regulation. Current enforcement efforts face challenges, with Ireland’s regulatory bodies overwhelmed by responsibilities and criticized for lax enforcement. Member states should consolidate their digital standards to ensure a unified approach to combating disinformation.

Third, implementation of the DSA must be accelerated. Each EU member state is required to appoint a Digital Services Coordinator, yet many have not complied. Poland only recently announced a coordination body, while Germany’s office was understaffed during its federal election, potentially contributing to the spread of harmful content by far-right groups.

Fourth, Europe should increase cooperation with Taiwan, which has developed rapid-response systems capable of addressing disinformation within two hours. Though facing its own challenges in creating DSA-like legislation, Taiwan offers valuable expertise in countering Chinese disinformation tactics, while Europe can share insights gained from confronting Russian interference.

A complete ban on TikTok should be considered only if these measures prove ineffective. Such action would present significant challenges, as the platform is projected to have 285.21 million European users by 2028, including 42% of social media users in Germany alone. Any ban risks accusations of censorship and could portray the EU as isolationist at a time when public trust is already fragile.

However, India’s 2020 ban on TikTok demonstrated that users can adapt by shifting to alternatives like Instagram Reels and YouTube Shorts. Should Europe pursue similar action, it would need to conduct comprehensive reviews of all similar applications to ensure regulatory compliance and address public concerns about both security and censorship.

While a TikTok ban represents a last resort, the threats posed by algorithmic manipulation, disinformation, and foreign surveillance demand serious consideration. Effective countermeasures require improved coordination between EU institutions and national authorities, significantly increased resources for enforcement agencies, and regular training for staff involved in digital regulation.