Influence Operations in Southeast Asia: Evolving Tactics and Rising Citizen Participation

Influence operations (IOs) in Southeast Asia are undergoing significant transformation, with ordinary citizens increasingly taking center stage in campaigns that shape public opinion across the region. New research from the RAIDAR project at Thailand’s Chulalongkorn University reveals how these operations have evolved beyond traditional state-directed efforts to become more citizen-driven, algorithm-enhanced, and platform-specific.

The study, conducted in collaboration with researchers from Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, and the Philippines, highlights three major shifts in how influence operations function across Southeast Asia.

Most notably, non-state actors—including everyday citizens, social media influencers, and private companies—are increasingly overshadowing government-directed campaigns. This trend was starkly illustrated during the 2023-2024 anti-Rohingya campaigns in Indonesia, where coordinated messaging claimed refugees were exploiting local communities by discarding donated food and stealing from villagers.

What made these campaigns distinctive wasn’t just their synchronized timing or messaging but the motivations behind them. Interviews with Indonesian “buzzers”—local parlance for influence workers—revealed many participants were homemakers, single mothers, and political party volunteers who weren’t solely motivated by payment.

“Many expressed feeling a moral obligation to participate, framing their xenophobic messaging as an act of patriotism,” the research notes. This emotional investment by ordinary users creates challenges for social media platforms whose moderation systems primarily target coordinated inauthentic behavior from institutional actors rather than genuinely motivated individuals.

The second major shift involves how social media algorithms that typically personalize commercial content are now cultivating bottom-up influence operations driven by political fans. This phenomenon gained significant visibility during Thailand’s 2023 general election, where supporters of Move Forward Party’s prime ministerial candidate Pita Limcharoenrat utilized platforms like X and TikTok to boost his visibility.

“His supporters exploited platform algorithms to synchronize messaging, while opponents spread manipulated images and misleading information through fan pages on LINE and Facebook,” according to Thai researchers involved in the project.

A similar pattern emerged in the Philippines, where former President Rodrigo Duterte’s “die-hard fans” consistently defended his controversial war on drugs despite international criticism. His successor, Ferdinand Marcos Jr., has adopted comparable strategies, further entrenching personality-centered politics through algorithmic influence networks.

This trend raises profound questions about the diminishing relevance of policy platforms in modern election campaigns and whether party politics is becoming increasingly deinstitutionalized in favor of charismatic figureheads—a global pattern now normalizing across Southeast Asia.

The third significant shift relates to platform-specific challenges. Traditional influence campaigns that thrived on text-based platforms like Facebook struggle to gain traction on newer visual platforms such as TikTok, which prioritizes creative, self-produced content and perceived authenticity.

Malaysia exemplifies this challenge. Traditional “cybertroop” operations, often linked to ruling parties, have struggled to adapt their messaging to TikTok’s algorithm, which favors seemingly genuine, amateur-style presentations. This environment has forced influence operations to evolve from automated, anonymous accounts to strategies built around recognizable personalities and content creators.

To assess the impact of these evolving tactics, the RAIDAR project conducted an expert survey using purposive sampling of 100 specialists in disinformation across Southeast Asia. The survey examined how three algorithmic tactics—coordinated “astroturfing” by influence workers, organized harassment, and microtargeted advertising—affected electoral processes and social cohesion.

The results were telling: over 80 percent of respondents agreed that manipulated content reinforced political divides, fueled prejudice against minorities, and eroded trust in both election results and traditional media. Nearly 92 percent viewed financial incentives for viral content as a key driver of extremism.

Most respondents (88 percent) identified lack of platform oversight as particularly damaging. However, 89 percent expressed concerns about government-led regulation of disinformation, noting the risk that anti-democratic actors might weaponize such measures to restrict political freedoms.

The findings reinforce the need for a “system-based” approach to tackling the disinformation ecosystem. Experts recommend a multi-pronged framework addressing both the political utility of coordinated disinformation during elections and the socioeconomic incentives drawing ordinary users into such campaigns.

Proposed solutions include demonetizing malign influence operations, strengthening election commission oversight of political advertising, and leveraging ASEAN’s regional influence to push platforms toward greater algorithmic transparency and responsible content governance.

Beyond technical solutions, policymakers must address structural conditions—economic insecurity, institutional mistrust, and social polarization—that make citizens susceptible to participation in influence campaigns. Any regulatory response should include democratic safeguards ensuring accountability and multistakeholder participation.

As Southeast Asia navigates these complex challenges, reducing incentives for harmful influence operations while strengthening systems that support accurate, trustworthy information remains the essential balancing act for the region’s digital future.