Armenia Faces Hybrid Attacks as Elections Approach

Armenia Faces Coordinated Disinformation Campaign Ahead of 2026 Elections

Armenia is battling what officials describe as a large-scale hybrid attack ahead of parliamentary elections scheduled for June 2026. The coordinated disinformation campaign has become so severe that Armenian authorities have requested assistance from European partners, with the European Union already allocating €15 million to strengthen the country’s resilience against such threats.

The Foreign Intelligence Service of Armenia recently disclosed details of these hybrid attacks in its annual report. While not explicitly naming the foreign actors involved, the agency warned that malicious campaigns are designed to influence society during the pre-election period and manipulate voters’ choices through false information, distorted content, and narratives that undermine Armenia’s interests.

“Visible propaganda against Armenia is mainly carried out by foreign state or government bodies, including intelligence services or resources linked to them,” the intelligence service stated in its report. “Covert operations, which often fuel and amplify visible propaganda, rely on websites and user accounts that show no obvious traces of any foreign state actor.”

The report highlighted the growing sophistication of these attacks, noting that in 2025, various actors deployed tactics involving the spread of false information through fake accounts, advertising, and bot networks. The intelligence service also expressed concern about the increasing use of artificial intelligence to generate false text and audiovisual materials.

Media experts monitoring the situation have identified Russian bot networks and Azerbaijani propaganda outlets as the primary sources of fake content. One prominent Russian operation, the pro-Kremlin bot network “Matryoshka,” has directly targeted Armenia after previously focusing on Ukraine and Moldova. The network has circulated AI-generated videos accusing Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan of building “gas chambers” and falsely claimed that singer Cher called for his abduction.

The disinformation campaigns have extended beyond the prime minister to other high-ranking officials. Parliamentary Speaker Alen Simonyan was targeted by a fake publication claiming he had built a “pedophile empire” for senior officials, alleging involvement by Pashinyan, his close associates, and security chiefs. Another false claim suggested that Armenian authorities had pressured UNICEF since 2020 to understate statistics on crimes against children.

In a recent development, Armenia’s Ministry of Justice refuted claims published on VT Foreign Policy that accused Pashinyan of appointing judges from his inner circle to “cleanse” the country’s political field ahead of elections. The ministry emphasized that the prime minister “has no authority, influence or involvement at any stage of the selection or appointment of judges.”

Azerbaijani websites have contributed to the information warfare by publishing fabricated letters supposedly from the European Commission and fake videos accusing Armenian intelligence services. Pro-Russian media outlets and Telegram channels operating within Armenia have further amplified these materials.

Political analyst Boris Navasardyan has provided insights into the different objectives behind the disinformation campaigns from Russia and Azerbaijan. According to Navasardyan, Russian attacks aim to delegitimize Armenia’s electoral process and fragment its electorate.

“The goal is to ensure that no political force gains a stable majority and that any government has to rely on fragile coalitions,” Navasardyan explained. “Such an outcome can reduce the country’s governability and weaken its ability to take key decisions on security and development.”

In contrast, Azerbaijan’s disinformation efforts focus on undermining Armenia’s international standing. “This represents an attempt to discredit Armenia and its government to reduce support from the international community,” Navasardyan noted. Despite these efforts, Azerbaijan has recently taken actions that appear to strengthen Pashinyan’s domestic political position, including returning four convicted Armenians and adopting a softer stance on border delimitation and unblocking communications.

As Armenia confronts these hybrid threats, Navasardyan suggests that verifying and debunking false information is more effective than attempting to block content, especially for smaller countries with limited cyber-defense resources. Armenia has established a Strategic Communications unit (StratCom) to develop state information policy that addresses these risks, though its effectiveness remains to be seen as it has only recently begun operations.

The outcome of these information battles will likely play a significant role in shaping Armenia’s political landscape ahead of next year’s elections, with regional stability and Armenia’s relationships with both Russia and Azerbaijan hanging in the balance.